THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOL. CI NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1939 NUMBER 1303

The Threat to the Low Countries

A few days ago, it seemed that Hitler was about to undertake a drive through Belgium and the Netherlands, either as a means of turning the flank of the Maginot Line or to obtain a more advantageous base for an attack on England. Great numbers of German troops were reported to be massed along the frontier; the Dutch and the Belgians were on the alert. Then all at once everyone was saying that the danger was past. The Italian press, which ought to know, announced the change of intention characteristically by denying Hitler had ever planned to attack the little neutrals. The Dutch Premier broadcast a statement that he sees no particular reason for alarm.

Did Hitler ever intend to attack in the West? And if so, what caused him to change his mind? Was the scheme merely another chapter in the war of nerves? Was it a feint to cover an intended drive in some other region, perhaps the Balkans? Has he been stopped, as some reports say, by disunity and confusion at home, including strong opposition within the army? In the welter of uncertainty, one thing seems clear: Hitler badly wants peace. There is no doubt he welcomed the Dutch-Belgian offer of mediation and decided to refuse only when it was certain the proposal had no chance.

The Dutch-Belgian Peace Move

On hearing that two very respectable, kind and beloved monarchs, the Belgian King and the Dutch Queen, had offered to mediate peace, world opinion at once became agitated. What could be the motives behind that move—German pressure?—a delicate hint to Germany that the two countries would stand together should one of them be invaded?—or had these monarchs secretly joined the Comintern? The real motive surely could not be what the mediators themselves said, more or less clearly: that the war is causing them trouble and that they want to see it ended for selfish and humanitarian reasons—it would be extraordinary indeed that anybody should say exactly what he has on his mind. The situation suggests an old Jewish joke: In a train speeding from Cracow to Warsaw, one passenger asks another where he is going. "To Warsaw," he answers. "How can that be?" says the first. "If you were really going to Warsaw, you would have told me that you were going to Cracow, but this train actually *does* go to Warsaw. So why are you lying?"

Munich Mystery

The Munich beer-hall bombing is a treat for detective-story readers. Applying the well known amateur technique, one would look for motive and opportunity. Motive leads to so many millions of suspects that it offers no clue. But those who had an opportunity to place the bomb must have been narrowly limited in number. In view of the meticulous care taken to protect Hitler, it is a reasonable assumption that someone charged with this duty is implicated. It looks like an inside job. But any insider entrusted with protection should also have known that Hitler was going to leave early, because the arrangements for the return trip

CONTENTS

The Week 123
Editorials
A Policy for the Pacific 125
Getting Around the Law 127
The Collapse of War 128
General Articles
Hitler as Thinker . . . . Max Lerner 129
India in the War . . . . H. N. Brailsford 133
Buying "Good Will" in Latin America . . . . . Katherine Rodell 135
How Big Should the Farm Be? . . . . . William G. Roylance 137
It's a Wise Father . . . . John Stevens 139
To a Molecule (verse) . . E. D. Kennedy 139
Washington Notes . . . . . T. R. B. 140
Other People's Money . . John T. Flynn 141
French and Indians . . . Otis Ferguson 142
The Bandwagon 143
Correspondence 143
Books in Review
Mr. Justice Frankfurter . Felix S. Cohen 145
Number, Please . . . . E. D. Kennedy 146
With Clive in India . . . Nigel Dennis 147
Our Enemy the Sea . . . Otis Ferguson 147
Science and Marxism . . . Harold Ward 148
A Reader's List 149

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1939, IN THE U.S.A. BY EDITORIAL PUBLICATIONS, INC., 40 EAST 49TH ST., NEW YORK, N. Y.
ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879
PRINTED IN THE U. S. A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would have had to be made in advance. The obvious inference from this pair of assumptions is that the bomb was not intended to kill Hitler.

From there one can go on to numerous questions. Was it a Nazi trick to justify a new purge, or to increase loyalty to the Führer, or to direct hatred against a neutral about to be attacked, or to justify a savage offensive against Britain? Or was it a device by one faction to discredit another? Against all these assumptions and theories is the belief of many close observers that the explosion, by calling attention to underground opposition, is a shock to Nazi morale. We are not likely to know for a long time, if ever, what really happened. For whatever the Gestapo may discover about the facts, we may be sure that the public explanation will be the one best suited to propaganda purposes.

The Politics of the Nobel Prize

Sometimes the award of the Nobel Prize in Literature is a purely literary event, a laurel crown and a bundle of banknotes for a distinguished writer. But in times of international crisis, it becomes a diplomatic event as well, and can be interpreted as a manifesto of sympathy by the Swedish Academy, not for a writer alone, but for the whole nation he represents. That is most certainly the case this year. Frans Eemil Sillenpää is the great man of Finnish letters, author of fifteen books dealing chiefly with life among the peasants. Two of his novels—"The Maid Silja" and "Meek Heritage" —were widely praised in this country, but not widely read; we plan to report on them next week. Meanwhile we quote from a special cable to The New York Times:

> Helsinki, Finland, Nov. 10.—The award of the Nobel Prize in Literature to Frans Eemil Sillenpää . . . sent a thrill of joy through the country. . . . His championship over many years of Scandinavian coöperation has made him popular in Sweden, Norway and Denmark.
>
> Mr. Sillenpää personifies Nordic cultural unity, and the Nobel award, it is held here, accentuates the strength of these idealistic, literary links.

It also strengthens Finnish resistance to the Russian demand for naval bases—a fact of which the Swedish Academy was perhaps not unaware.

Snooting the Soviets

Item 1. The last big reception at the Soviet embassy in Washington was attended by no Cabinet members, no Justices of the Supreme Court, no Senators and only two Representatives, who looked uncomfortable. *Item 2.* The territorial delegate from Alaska, Mr. Dimond, asked that Alaska be fortified against a possible Soviet invasion (and also to spite Mr. Molotov). *Item 3.* At a meeting in New York City, Louis Waldman demanded the recall of Soviet Ambassador Oumansky, on the ground that he had been accused in The Saturday Evening Post of having formerly belonged to the Russian secret service and of having formerly spied on his Russian superiors. There has been a whole series of incidents in which Americans have manifested their disapproval of the pact by looking down their noses or sticking out their tongues at the Soviet representatives in this country.

They should be reminded that, whatever we may think of Russian foreign policy, the United States is not at war with the Soviet Union. Britain and France are not at war with the Soviet Union. It is to the best interests of the governments and people of both countries that the Soviet Union should remain at peace. That explains why British comments on the Russo-German pact have been much more restrained than ours. There is, however, an influential clique in France and England that would like to see the present struggle in Europe transformed into a holy war, not for democracy—God forbid!—but for property rights and ruling-class interests. As allies in the anti-Bolshevik crusade, they would like to have Mussolini and the Mikado, and they would even accept Field Marshal Goering, if Hitler were only put out of the way. But the biggest and best ally would of course be the United States, with its idealistic young soldiers, ready to believe anything, and its inexhaustible supply of gold. . . . The Americans liberals who are now so busy snooting the Soviets ought to be warned that they are coöperating with some of the world's most powerful enemies of liberalism.

Chrysler Learns Slowly

The prolonged stoppage of Chrysler production at the beginning of the new automobile season is costly for the workers affected, the employer and the dealers. But its chief cause is an attitude toward collective bargaining on the part of Chrysler that belongs, if not to the stone age of industrial relations, at least to the bronze age. Two main points of controversy block a settlement —the demand for a union shop and the demand for impartial settlement of disputes about the speed of production, whenever the union and the company cannot agree. The union says it is ready to waive the first if satisfaction can be obtained on other questions.

Under the union shop, existing non-union workers are not compelled to join the organization, but new employees must join in thirty days. The main argument for it is that a union which comprises a large majority of the workers and accepts the responsibility for adjusting disputes, carrying out agreements and furthering orderly production, should be kept strong so that it can properly perform its function. Workers who accept its benefits should not be allowed to slide along without sharing its burdens. Impartial adjustment of disputes about production, as about other grievances, is one of the best means of stabilizing industrial relations and furthering efficiency. It has a long record of success in the men's clothing industry, under the progressive leadership of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The contention of the management that while it will listen to grievances it must retain final decision is the attitude of an autocrat who cannot maintain the confidence and coöperation of the workers.

Advice from the Pope

Pope Pius was badly advised by those who aided him in the preparation of his encyclical letter to America of November 11. The Pope is of course unfamiliar with American history, tradition and present outlook; this is no discredit to him, since he has had no special opportunity to learn about this country. His Catholic advisers in the United States did him a grave injustice, however, when they persuaded him to demand the teaching of religion in the schools. The separation of Church and State is a matter on which Americans are extremely sensitive. The Pope on the whole thinks like an Italian, as it is only natural that he should. Anyone living under a dictatorship and in general satisfied with that way of life should be extremely careful in giving advice to the inhabitants of a democracy on subjects which they consider of first importance. The American advisers of the Pope ought to remember that this country is overwhelmingly non-Catholic; and that the bitter intolerance of the Ku Klux Klan and similar groups is still lurking just below the surface.

Semantics on The New Masses

A sign of the changing times is an article that appeared the other day in The New Masses, that lively Communist weekly which manages to cling to Stalin's coat-tails no matter how many figure-eights he cuts. This was an article attacking the Socialists, who were described throughout as "Social Democrats." That phrase, despite the heroic efforts of the Social-Democratic Federation, is a European one unfamiliar to the mass of Americans except in dispatches from abroad. Before August 21, The New Masses would not have attacked the "Social Democrats," since that would have been disloyal to the United Front policy. It would have done so prior to 1935, when the United Front went into effect, but it wouldn't then have called them "Social Democrats." It would have called them "Social Fascists," which was at that time the stock epithet. It can't call them "Social Fascists" today, however, because it doesn't dare use "Fascist" as a term of reproach, in view of the close relations between Moscow and Berlin. So it calls them "Social Democrats."

News Notes of a Week

In London, the usual Armistice Day gathering at the Cenotaph was called off as an air-raid precaution. . . . Prime Minister de Valera told the Dail that he could not free four young members of the Irish Republican Army whose hunger-strike in a Dublin jail had brought them close to death. The announcement was followed by threats to the Prime Minister's life. . . . In Toyko, the new Institute of the Pacific advised Japan, in effect, to grab herself some of that good South Seas oil, now that the war had provided a "golden opportunity" for her to win at the old Shell game. . . . In his reply to the peace plea of the Dutch and Belgian sovereigns, King George again failed to state the British war aims. Instead he referred to earlier documents in which the Prime Minister had also failed to state them.

Dr. Goebbels launched what looks like a plan for the annexation of New Jersey with a barrage of 15,000 propaganda leaflets addressed to residents of the state, alleging the use of poison gas by Britain. . . . Orders from the United States Army and abroad boomed the monthly production capacity of the airplane industry to 1,250 planes and produced a serious shortage of skilled labor. . . . As the longshoremen's strike began to spread from New York along the coast, Joseph P. Ryan of the International Longshoremen's Association obtained the mediation services of the Department of Labor, after rejecting those of the Maritime Labor Board because he lacked confidence in it.

A Policy for the Pacific

While Americans have recently had no eyes except for Europe, important changes have been developing in the Far East. It is here, rather than across the Atlantic, that we are now likely to become involved. American isolationism has not for many years ruled our action in Asia as in the Occident. And at present our government is poised on the brink of a decision that few of us understand or are prepared for. It is time to devote careful attention to Far Eastern policy if war is not to come in by the back door while we are engaged in barring it at the front.

Japan, after expending great resources of finance and man-power, is unable to finish the Chinese war. She cannot seem to advance farther; neither can she retreat. The military have not given up their aim of conquest, and they have so implicated the Emperor and the nation that a simple withdrawal is impossible without loss of "face"—that highest of all values to the Japanese. At the same time, the people are restive under the strain and the more liberal political and industrial forces are looking for a way out.

That way, the Japanese hope, has been provided by the outbreak of war in Europe. To be sure, the collapse of the anti-Comintern alliance has deprived Japan of immediate help from Germany or Italy, and the fact that the Soviet Union is not engaged in hostilities on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the western front makes inadvisable an assault upon her in the East. Nevertheless, little direct help would come from Germany anyway, while the mere fact that Britain and France are fully engaged elsewhere greatly weakens their power in Asia. They want to keep Japan out of the war and so might consent to a deal with Tokyo at the expense of nationalist China. And the Soviet Union has apparently set out to cultivate more friendly relations with Japan, now that the menace of aggression against Siberia and Outer Mongolia is removed. A partition of China between Japanese and Russian spheres of influence, on the principle of the partition of Poland, is by no means entirely out of the question.

One can already discern the outlines of the settlement Japan seems to be working for: a puppet Chinese government in the northeastern provinces to be ruled by her, leaving West China to the Soviet Union and South China to Britain and France. This would not, of course, be a permanent settlement. From the Japanese imperialists' point of view, it would be a way station where they could sit down and rest until a more favorable opportunity arose. From the Chinese point of view it would be a conquest to be undermined by every means possible, even if decades were required to overturn it.

Chinese action has already been handicapped by the diminished aid from Britain and France, although new supplies from the Soviet Union have partly compensated for this loss. While the Chinese government may hold the west, it has not much chance of driving the Japanese from the east by active fighting, and this chance would be diminished if the Soviet Union should come to terms with Japan. For the moment, then, the principal obstacle to Japanese plans lies in the United States.

We have abrogated the trade treaty with Japan, a necessary step if we are to establish the embargoes which are strongly supported by a strong body of opinion in this country. Japan is largely dependent upon us for machine tools, petroleum products, cotton and other materials essential both for the prosecution of war and the development of peaceful commerce. The treaty expires in January. We are still protesting vigorously about Japan's interference with our treaty rights in China; Ambassador Grew has made an unusually sharp speech of warning. Not only does our present tendency constitute a serious economic threat, but it stiffens British and French resistance to a possible deal; they are more concerned with keeping our good will than with satisfying Tokyo.

We have built a giant navy and are planning greatly to enlarge it. This policy is naturally regarded as a deadly menace by the Japanese. Military quarters are retorting by pointing to the United States as the eventual enemy; there is much talk of extending Japan's influence in the Southern Pacific, and especially, of capturing supplies of oil and other necessary materials in the Dutch East Indies. Any attack by Germany on the Netherlands would advance such a project; and there would be strong pressure on Washington to stop it. There has long been a danger that economic sanctions imposed on Japan by Western nations would lead to war by this route; that danger is increased by the presence of war in Europe.

What other course is open? At first sight it would seem that the only alternative is to assent, tacitly or otherwise, to Japan's conquests in China. By making a renewed trade agreement with her we could doubtless exact some concessions about respect for American interests. Japan might indeed offer us, as she is willing to offer Britain, a junior partnership in the exploitation of the territories she controls—a chance to finance her economic penetration and to share in its profits, if any. But we should have to abandon any interest in China's political integrity, in the Open Door and all the rest of it. We should, in effect, be acknowledging the supremacy of Japan, enforced by arms, in the Far East.

Such a sharpening of the issue at once raises the question what our stake in the Far East really is. What is the national interest involved? Our existing trade and investments are not large enough even to warrant the maintenance of a big navy, to say nothing of the cost of a war. Japanese trade is worth far more to us than Chinese. The policy behind the Open Door and the Nine Power Pacific Treaty was based partly on the assumption that some day Chinese trade would become important; in the future large investments would be required. When such a great people actually began to be industrialized on the Western scale, it would be an unparalleled opportunity for us to pour forth capital and capital goods. That is still potentially true. If the opportunity were offered, it might rescue our harassed economy from years of depression and unemployment in the heavy industries. The New Republic naturally believes that there are other ways to solve this problem, and that war for economic interest should be resisted to the last gasp; nevertheless the prospect of this opportunity is still alluring to those who shape foreign policy.

In addition, there is our emotional interest in China and her integrity, compounded partly of liking for the Chinese, partly of dislike for military aggression. The purely material interest might be served by a compromise with Japan; this could not. It is worth something to us, however intangible the gain may be, not to connive at the disruption of Chinese autonomy, even if we are not prepared to fight for it.

To move toward embargo and an enforcement of Japan's return to the status existing before the "China incident" is to move toward war, for Japan will never lose so much face so long as she can resist. To make terms with Japan at this juncture is to grant at least part of what she desires and so to betray China. But

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

why need we do either? The usual answer is that history will not wait; only those with positive programs establish their aims. If we do nothing, Japan will strengthen her hold on China anyway, while the advocates of economic or even of military sanctions in this country will gain adherents. The choice cannot indefinitely be postponed.

If both horns of the dilemma are to be avoided, a positive program of some kind must be found. Such a program seems to us to lie in an application of the traditional policy of the United States to the new situation, an application that would both keep open the chance of preserving Chinese independence and give Japan an opportunity to save face. At present a program of this kind can hardly be formulated in a treaty with Japan. But may it not be set forth in a treaty with China? Such a treaty might be signed by the United States, Britain and France on the one hand, and by China on the other. It might contain substantially the following principles:

1. The Western nations will relinquish, step by step, their existing special privileges in China—treaty ports, extraterritoriality, garrisons, etc., provided other nations having or asserting such privileges do so at the same time.

2. Whenever a schedule like this can be arranged, and hostilities cease, the powers will form a consortium to extend to China governmental loans for industrial development and other necessary purposes. Such a consortium shall be open to all adhering to the treaty, with due regard to their special interests and abilities.

3. This agreement shall be open to all other nations wishing to adhere to it.

Having done this, we could simply let our relations with Japan remain as they are until Japan wished to move toward our position. We need not negotiate a new trade treaty. We need not impose embargoes; the possibility of their imposition, however, would remain in being. Japan would be assured that if she agreed to withdraw from China, she would be doing nothing more than the other great powers were willing to do; this would save her face and deprive her of the justification that she is doing now only the sort of thing they have done in the past. Japan would also know that if she accepted this arrangement she would be assured a large share in the development of Chinese industry and trade; Chinese revenge would be relinquished. The treaty would at the same time deprive Japan of the hope that she could win the connivance of the Western powers for her program of exclusive imperialism. Her only choice, so long as she did not agree to the program, would be to continue a costly war that she would not know how otherwise to end. At the same time, Chinese morale would be greatly strengthened.

The anomalous position of the United States in the present Asiatic war has always been that if we opposed Japan we seemed to be serving other imperialist interests which, though for the moment they were less dangerous to China, yet were just as bad in principle. If we could first get the record clear, we should be in an immensely stronger position. And we should not be in so much danger of drifting into war—a war for confused and insufficient purposes. Let us see whether we cannot get some benefit out of the European conflict for ourselves and China by inducing Britain and France to endorse a conciliatory program on which we can stand with a clear conscience.

Getting Around the Law

THE EFFORT TO TRANSFER American ships to the Panamanian flag so that they can continue to trade with Great Britain and France seems to us clearly a dangerous attempt to circumvent the amended neutrality law. True, these ships would not be under our flag and the crews would be foreigners. Nevertheless, the vessels would still be owned in this country. The shipping lobby, one of the most powerful in Washington, would continue to be actively interested in them. If they were sunk by German submarines—as some of them, under the law of probability, very likely would be—the Americans would be far more concerned than they would over the sinking of a Norwegian or Danish vessel.

It is far better for this country that American ships should be taken off the dangerous North Atlantic routes. There is plenty of work for them in other parts of the world, with 100 merchant vessels already sent to the bottom of the ocean since the war began. As our Washington correspondent points out on page 140 of this issue, a plan to substitute British and French for American ships in the North Atlantic was worked out long before the war began. American shipping interests are trying to break that agreement for the sake of rich profits. We hope they do not succeed. They are entitled to some compensation for the injury to their business, and such compensation should be paid. We should remember, however, that their business is heavily subsidized by the government in several ways, some of which are hidden from the public view. We could probably well afford to pay them a good rate of profit to keep their ships idle, rather than the degree of subsidy they have received in recent years. Far more deserving of sympathy than the companies, for whom our officials are so solicitous, are the thousands of American seamen who find themselves on the beach because of the operations of the new law. No shipping company, so far as we know, has ever dreamed of helping its men through periods of enforced idleness as the more enlightened domestic corporations now do. Taking care of the seamen who are out of work should be a first charge on the government which put them there.

There are ominous overtones to the effort of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States Lines to transfer its ships to the Panamanian flag. It looks very much as though administration officials had a pretty little plan to circumvent the neutrality law and were not candid with the members of Congress while the bill was being debated. It seems probable that only Mr. Hull's pique because he had not been consulted on an important issue prevented the ships from being transferred at once and the American people from facing a *fait accompli*. As far as we can judge, it was only the roar from an outraged public opinion that in the end prevented the President from immediately authorizing the transfer. Mr. Roosevelt makes no secret of the fact that he is strongly pro-Ally. So is the great majority of the American people. It is one thing, however, to be pro-Ally in sentiment and another to engage in acts which strengthen the danger of entanglement in war.

The Collapse of War

MARXISTS HAVE A THEORY that capitalism, when it reaches its culmination and cannot expand any more, will develop internal contradictions which will make inevitable its own collapse. Then it must give way to another social order. When we look abroad, the question arises whether this so-called "law of development" may not be operating at this moment in the history of war.

War has become "total." Entire national economies and cultures are now devoted to preparing to wage it. No device of mechanics, politics or psychology is overlooked as a weapon. Surely the culmination of war has been reached; there is no possibility of further development for it. Knowing this, we had supposed that the outbreak of this war would be the signal for unparalleled devastation, which might wipe man himself off the face of the earth. On the contrary, we see no serious fighting. Having mobilized for destruction, the armies wait while the hostilities are still carried on, as in time of "peace," by economic and diplomatic measures.

For years Captain Liddell Hart, the military correspondent of The London Times, has argued that an offensive should not be attempted unless the attackers have an overwhelming superiority of at least three to one and preferably more than that in men and material. Defense—stalwart defense and nothing more—is possible, however, only so long as ministers and publics are willing to consent to what seems military inactivity and do not clamor for victory.

In an article that he published in The London Times two years ago, Captain Hart made more explicit than he has in his books another consideration which may be limiting offensive operations. Mass armies, mechanization, bombing from the air, fire, gas, chemicals—the war potentials are now so tremendous and horrible that even soldiers hesitate to explore their extent and to risk retaliation in kind. Captain Hart suggested that warfare might gradually return to the eighteenth-century conception of limited warfare for points—a game which cleverer players would win, in which strategy and skill would again be more important than mass, and in which imponderables of economic strength and civilian morale might be decisive.

Such a tacit "limitation of war," he declared, "may well precede its desired elimination." This would come about not from "the conversion of power-lusting rulers to higher ideals but simply on the compulsion of hard facts." War as an instrument of national policy would be a weapon whose use would so hurt the user as well as those against whom it was used as to fall into disuse. "The prospect of this limited solution," he continued, "may be as unsatisfactory in principle to moralists and pacifists as to militarists, but it offers the most practical possibility of preserving civilization."

Total war has certainly developed a fatal internal contradiction—strategy itself forbids either side to fight. Of course this does not apply to the one-sided sort of affair that took place in Poland, but that was not the culmination of total war on a grand scale. Faced by an enemy who is not equipped in the modern manner, the aggressor may still attack. But when great industrialized nations rise to arms, they put every available man in uniform, go to work making weapons, line up on the frontiers, and then see who gets tired of it first. If either combatant is so rash as to start fighting, he will surely be defeated.

Maybe the contradiction will not prevent bloody destruction this time. But we hope it does, and we can see no fate for war in the calculable future except the collapse of the institution itself.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

Editors
BRUCE BLIVEN MALCOLM COWLEY R. M. LOVETT
GEORGE SOULE STARK YOUNG

Assistant Editors: OTIS FERGUSON ELIZABETH HULING

Contributing Editors
JAMES BENÉT BRUCE BLIVEN JR. H. N. BRAILSFORD
HEYWOOD BROUN JOHN T. FLYNN WALDO FRANK
E. C. LINDEMAN JON. MITCHELL LEWIS MUMFORD
REXFORD G. TUGWELL

Treasurer: DANIEL MEBANE

E. G. WOOD, *Advertising Manager* BYRON DEXTER, *Circulation Manager*

SINGLE COPIES, FIFTEEN CENTS; YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION, FIVE DOLLARS; CANADIAN, FIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS; FOREIGN, SIX DOLLARS; THREE MONTHS' TRIAL, ONE DOLLAR

EDITED AND PRODUCED UNDER UNION CONDITIONS BY CONTRACT WITH THE BOOK AND MAGAZINE GUILD, LOCAL 18, UOPWA, CIO.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hitler as Thinker

THERE is no autobiography in history that can match the fantastic quality of "Mein Kampf." Reading it we are in a universe of grotesque proportions—a nightmare Wonderland in which we are all Alices watching the distorted perspectives. World movements like Christianity, socialism, democracy, are reduced to items in the ego-displacement of a little Austrian water-color dauber. Whole nations and continents become the stamping-ground of his restless personality. His tastes and traumata are expanded into universals to decide the destiny of millions. Here is, in Nietzsche's terms, a "transvaluation of values" with a vengeance. In fact Nietzsche often comes to mind in reading these pages. Not Nietzsche the thinker-craftsman, nor the believer in the "European man," nor the creator of the "gay science"—but he of the autobiography, "Ecce Homo," written in the fitful gleams of sanity preceding his complete collapse.

There are those who have compared "Mein Kampf" with "Das Kapital" on the ground that both are the bibles of world movements and rationalize the revolutionary impulses of millions. But to compare Hitler's book with Marx's is unfair to both. Marx, for all his vanity, was no megalomaniac; "Mein Kampf" may be described as the anatomy of megalomania. Since Marxism is nothing if not rationalistic, its key-book is a pitiless analysis, in the Ricardian tradition, of the dynamics of our economy. But the key-book of Nazism describes the tempestuous voyage of a tortured mind. It is a mind that has rejected our gods, broken through the taboos that we call civilization, and fashioned a god in its own image and a demonology of its own.

For despite its tirades against individualism, "Mein Kampf" is in reality the individualist dream run amuck. The personality that emerges from its pages is a blending of all that is grandiose in the European Bonapartist tradition with the most fantastic elements of the American success story. It is a cross between Napoleon and Horatio Alger. It is the Little Corporal dreaming of world empire; it is also the saga of Pluck and Luck, the Boy from Braunau Who Made Good. You have here the apotheosis of sheer individual will imposing itself on the flux of events. Here is a sick mind, a lonely and dwarfed personality, that was able to convert its sickness and frustration into hate, its hate into vengeful ambition, its ambition into cold steel, its steel into an empire and a religion.

It will not do to dismiss "Mein Kampf" as a farrago of nonsense. Its very quality of not making sense is exactly what gives it effectiveness. We must rid ourselves of the view that only logical ideas can be political weapons. Ideas in politics are much like poetry: they need no inner logical structure to be effective. Edward Lear's nonsense verse merely extends a principle inherent in poetry as a whole. And Hitler is, in a sense, the Edward Lear of political thinking. He has taught us that, just as a limerick drives Shakespeare out of our minds, so by a similar Gresham's law illogical political ideas drive out the logical. And whether or not he makes sense, his book has become the profoundly evocative philosophy of millions of people.

Hitler's is a spoken rather than a written book. He dictated the first half of it to his secretary while he was a prisoner at the fortress at Landsberg on the Lech, after the 1923 "Beerhall" Putsch. And it has all the marks of a book that has been *talked*.

Such surely must have been the talk at the Munich *Stammtische* where habitués of all descriptions gathered over their beer and quarreled about the diverse roads to a commonly held Germanic mission. Such must have been the rhapsodic talk that Hanisch, Hitler's companion during the years when his fortune was at its lowest ebb, tells about: Hitler with his emaciated derelict face and his Jewish beard and his long tramp-cassock, declaiming against Marxism in the flophouse at Vienna-Brigittenau: Hitler sitting in the cheap Vienna restaurants while the customers discussed the daily headlines, and holding them spellbound with his attacks on the Jews and the Weimar government. Such must, finally, have been the speeches Hitler made at the huge Zirkuskrone mass meetings, when the rising young party leader stood for hours on the platform and loosed a wild torrent of talk that swept his listeners along with him.

Hitler has urged foreigners to uncover the metaphysical roots of Nazism; and one might well start with his book. If we are to find them, it must be in the soil of the German intellectual tradition. There are two major attitudes current today toward that tradition. One is that we have no quarrel with the German people—that what the Nazis are doing is superimposed on them, and runs counter to every element in the German past. The second attitude is that our quarrel is exactly with the German people, that they have a Nazi government today because they are Nazi at heart and have always been, and that the whole German intellectual tradition has been building up to Hitler. Neither of these is true. Actually, there are two German traditions, one humanist and the other anti-humanist, one stretching from Goethe and Lessing to Max Weber and Thomas Mann, the other from Fichte and Jean-Paul Richter to Spengler, Carl Schmitt and Alfred Bäumler. The first stresses freedom, the life of reason and the possibilities of human existence; the second stresses authority, the brutal and tempestuous in man and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

transcending of the human by the heroic and dæmonic. One subordinates the state to culture, the other subordinates culture to the state. One is European, the other fiercely nationalistic; one is democratic, the other feudal. In the great representative Germans the two are intertwined; yet in every German thinker, however complex, an emphasis on the one or the other is unmistakable.

The basic assumptions in "Mein Kampf" are not far from those of the anti-humanist strain in German thought. They are the assumptions that the masses of men are irrational creatures, acting from deep-lying drives of hunger, fear, imitation, herdism, sadism; that there are natural *Stände*, or gradations of rank, among men, from the slave-mass to the élite and finally to the Führer himself; that corresponding to these there are varying levels of consciousness, forming a mystical base for an eventual caste system; that the social world, like the biological, is a jungle; that man is, in Spengler's terms, "a beast of prey," and that only the strongest are worthy of survival; that where there is no room for the weak, Christianity is a luxury, humanitarianism runs against the grain of life, liberalism is folly, and democracy a crime; that there are sound and healthy tendencies in any community which have been poisoned by the Jews, weakened by Christianity and undermined by international capitalism and international socialism; that the core of any community (*Gemeinschaft*) is a people around a leader, tied together by idealistic bonds and by a sense of duty to the leader, and that the highest stage of such a community is the *Volksgemeinschaft*, or national community; that communities are not mechanisms but organisms, and that the element of spontaneity and organic growth is the essential element in them; that the *Geist*, or spirit, of a healthy community must run counter to the materialistic spirit of the modern age, and must return to the sense of duty, community honor and fealty to the leader that characterized the earlier Germanic community; that this *Geist* expresses itself only in a blood-community of race and in adherence to a native and common soil; that in the perception of such values there can be no logical categories but only an intuitionism that is its own principle and its own justification; that in the pursuance of them there will be a return to the basically masculine and military virtues, a substitution of force for the hypocrisy of legality, a substitution of dictatorship for the corruptions of democracy and the creation of a new élite to replace the massism of the democracies.

Leonard Woolf once wrote an absorbing little book called "Quack, Quack," in which he dealt with the quackeries of men like Keyserling, Spengler and Bergson in the intellectual field and of Mussolini and Hitler in the political, linking them with the mumbo-jumbo of primitive kingship. But Bergson and Spengler, while preparing the ground unconsciously for Hitler, were utterly honest craftsmen; while Hitler's quackery is not limited to the political field but has deep roots in the intellectual. One would look far in the whole anti-humanist intellectual tradition for the elaborate charlatanism of the concepts of *Geist* and *Volk* that one finds in Hitler's book. In short, Hitler's relation to the German intellectual tradition is that of a quick and mobile intelligence who has picked up some leading ideas and skillfully conscripted their intellectual and emotional force to his own uses. There are long passages in his book in which he accuses the Jews of being parasites on the host of modern culture; but his own position toward the ideas on which he builds is in the very same sense parasitic.

I have spoken of the ideas that Hitler assumes. How about the ideas he selects for discussion?

The underlying idea is that of blood and race—or better, racism. To an extent, in dealing with the racial interpretation of history, Hitler follows the traditional lines of Count Gobineau, who is the master of all the racial fanatics; Houston Stewart Chamberlain, whose "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century" was probably one of the books Hitler read with more than casualness; Bötticher (who wrote under the name of Paul de Lagarde) and Moeller van den Bruck, whose "Dritte Reich" was one of the bibles of the pre-Hitler reactionaries; and Rosenberg, whose "Mythus des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts" was published five years before Hitler wrote his book. Yet when you are dealing with the literature of racial genius, racial purity, racial superiority, you can scarcely trace a direct course. You are on an uncharted sea of mysticism and the subjective, where every mariner steers his own course.

Hitler proceeds by an elaborate division of races into three groups—the culture-creators (only the Aryans belong here), the culture-bearers (for example, the Japanese), the culture-destroyers (presumably only the Jews, yet Hitler includes the Negroes as well). This is a clever classification, for it enables Hitler to specify the perfect race and the parasite race while remaining vague about all the intermediate ones. Even in that paradise of the nebulous, the literature of race, Hitler is unparalleled in his vagueness. He brushes aside as irrelevant all questions of proof, of origins, of race history, of the relation between biological strains and psychological and cultural characteristics. He does not trouble to define race but appeals to the reader's consciousness of its reality. Above all, despite the fact that he calls his principal chapter on racism "Nation and Race," he nowhere compares the two or distinguishes between them.

Is it because such a distinction might prove inconvenient to Hitler's aims? For the cultural nationalists of modern European history, from Herder and Mazzini to Renan, had talked far more of nation than of race: and where they had talked of race it was as a vague abbreviation of the national character. To perform its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

function in the wars of liberation, nationalism had to be a unifying concept for the entire population. It could be exclusive in respect to other nationalities but it had to be inclusive in regard to its own. But Hitler's nationalism, since its function in the political revolution was to create both a heroic and a diabolic element, had to be at once unifying and divisive.

So drastic a reversal of the whole European tradition of cultural nationalism would have been almost impossible were it not that Hitler was addressing a bitter and defeated nation. Moeller van den Bruck, whose "Dritte Reich" influenced Hitler deeply, has spoken of the historical function of catastrophe in evoking the great revolutionary energies of a people. Hitler's nationalism is in that sense a nationalism bred of catastrophe. It is a twisted and stunted one, narrowed down to fit the purposes of a group seeking also to turn men's sense of insecurity into the politically profitable channels of counter-revolutionary hate.

But there is an essential contradiction within the race concept itself. To be unifying, a concept of racism must be idealistic—must stress the spirit of a race, its creativeness, its genius, its invincibility. But to be an effective demonology it must be specific and material, pointing a finger at the impure and the unelect, and devising ways of discovering them infallibly. It is not sufficiently emphasized that Hitler's race theory was confronted by two traditions—that of the lofty glorification of race, as in Gobineau, Nietzsche, Spengler, Rosenberg; and that of anti-Semitism pure and simple. And confronted by these two traditions he preferred not to choose between them but to combine them. Hence the experience the reader of "Mein Kampf" has in moving from misty vaporings about Aryanism to the macabre passages of vivid imagery, such as the famous one about the diabolic black-haired Jewish boy waiting in ambush for the unsuspecting Aryan girl and defiling her with his blood, or the one about the Jews' bringing the Negroes to the Rhine to bastardize the Aryans. But once Hitler is on this plane he has to break with Nietzsche and Spengler and the other race theorists who were not anti-Semitic. And he is forced also to be specific about tests for Aryanism. Race theorists have always encountered difficulties in creating objective tests for racial purity and impurity. A French physician during the war, avid to give concreteness to the inferiority of the German strain, undertook to prove that you could tell a German through a urinalysis. Similarly in Hitler the genealogical precision of the Nürnberg laws and the movement for sterilization become logical consequences of his doctrine—but they bring it down from the lofty plane on which it started.

Hitler's race doctrine remains, with his anti-Marxism, the most exportable part of the theory of his book. They are the part that can be used best by the Mosleys, the Coughlins and Kuhns. They are the spearhead of the Nazi International. Now that Hitler's power politics has forced him to drop his anti-Bolshevism, he must rely increasingly on his racism to rationalize his imperialist foreign policy as well as his internal tyranny. In fact, it has always been the blood concept that has linked his domestic with his foreign policy. In the case of anti-Semitism, it is blood-purity; in the case of imperialism, blood unity. But since Munich and since his attack on Poland, even blood-unity and the need for uniting Germans everywhere under one banner has proved inadequate, for Hitler has been extending the trajectory of his power beyond the boundaries of the countries where there are problems of German minorities. More and more, therefore, he is likely to move away even from the rhetoric of race and blood that fills the pages of "Mein Kampf," back to the naked imperialist slogan that appears in the book as "the conquest of the world by the Germans."

It is when we come to the question of ways and means for capturing power, extending it, consolidating it, that we reach Hitler's only real greatness in the history of thought—a greatness that cannot be denied even by those who hate what he stands for. Hitler is probably the greatest master of propaganda and organization in modern history. To find his equal one must go back to Loyola and the Jesuits. His insights are not insights into theory but into the strategy of ideas.

If we are to speak of Hitler as a psychologist, it is not in the ordinary sense. Professor Gordon Allport has recently told his fellow academic psychologists, in a presidential address, that from the standpoint of understanding how men's minds actually work they are inferior to statesmen and head waiters. Hitler knows nothing of academic lore. The organizer, Hitler says, "has to take man as he is. He has to take account of the weakness and of the bestiality equally." He takes men as he has found them empirically and he builds his appeals on his experience with them.

That experience has, in Hitler's case, been a curiously specialized one. He has scarcely ever confronted people except to impress, persuade, browbeat, cajole, rouse them. Even before he became a public figure he had public attitudes. If ever a man since Machiavelli went to the school of power, it was Hitler. The result is that life has presented to him only one mask—the mask of power; and only one problem—how to gain and hold power. And because life has thus limited itself for him, denying him the luxury of experiencing private decency and loyalty and love, he has taken his revenge by forming a low opinion of human nature and using it to the hilt.

He divides men into "the heads and the masses," the leaders and the herd. "Only a fraction of mankind," he says, "is energetic and bold." The rest are cowards and gulls. But the leaders can command the herd only by battering down the walls of opinion and the institutions of state power by which a previous

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ruling group has surrounded the herd. Hitler understands that the fight for power, whether to capture or retain it, must be conducted on two fronts: in the nerve-centers of men's minds and in the actual nerve-centers of the state—economic, administrative, military, diplomatic. Hence, he writes, "if a movement has the intention of pulling down a world and of building a new one in its place," it "will have to divide the human material it has won into two great groups: into followers and members." The followers are the mass whose ideas have been changed by the movement and who will in turn change the ideas of other followers. They are the hangers-on; without winning them over or neutralizing them, a movement cannot succeed. The members are the ruthless, disciplined group who will stop at nothing in the struggle for power.

On both scores Hitler and the Nazis borrowed extensively from the Marxist parties. It has been pointed out by several critics that Hitler's hatred of the Marxists may have arisen from his inability to answer their arguments in the days when he was trying out his mind against socialist intellectuals and trade unionists. Time after time he was thrown into confusion among the dialectical windings of a complex intellectual system. Time after time he returned, schooling himself painfully in the art of answering these arguments. "We had a chance," he writes, "to become acquainted with the incredible discipline of our opponents' propaganda, and still today it is my pride to have found the means . . . for beating finally its very makers. Two years later I was master in this craft."

It is interesting to note the pride of craftsmanship Hitler shows here. He addressed himself with passion to the task of mastering propaganda. He went to school not only to the Marxists. He has a great admiration for the organization and methods of the Catholic Church. He speaks again and again of how much he learned by studying the propaganda the British used during the war. And he expresses admiration for American advertising techniques. Put all these together, add the fact that some of the insights of the Freudian school into the "psychology of the depths" must have penetrated to the Nazi circles in their early years, and add finally a mind eager to learn from every experience with men in the mass during the years of war and revolution and reconstruction—and you have the materials out of which Hitler the propagandist and organizer was fashioned.

But these materials would have been nothing had it not been for the fanatical life-and-death earnestness of Hitler himself. This is not the place to explore the psychic springs of this driving will: that must be left to the students of abnormal psychology. But it is clear that very early Hitler mastered the first principle of the success of any movement; that, given a favorable soil and climate for development, a movement is the shadow of a man. Hitler's basic assumption is that in a world of inertia, everything must give way to a driving will; amid hesitation, assurance will triumph; amid complexity men will cling to something that is simple; amid disbelief they are eager for belief, even if externally imposed; in a world of passivity men want the experience of participation; in a world of humanitarian scruples the ruthless use of force will ultimately not be resisted. Finally, that we live by symbols, and that the personification of the leader is at the basis of politics as it is at the basis of religion.

The specific and rule-of-thumb injunctions with which Hitler's book is sprinkled may be traced back to these principles. They explain the advice he gives that you must always exaggerate your claims, even if fantastically; that you must never concede the slightest justice to your opponent's cause, else men will begin to doubt yours; that your platform, once formulated, must remain fixed; that you must hammer away always at a single idea; that the continued iteration of it will finally induce belief; that there is nothing so likely to be believed in the end as the daring and the unimaginable; that the masses "want the victory of the stronger and the annihilation or the unconditional surrender of the weaker." The principles I have mentioned explain also the tactics that Hitler used in the internal organization of his party: the hierarchy in which the only allegiance is to the leader at the top; the theatrical handling of public meetings; the ritual and insignia of membership; the complete contempt for democratic procedure; the use of drilling and marching; the policing of meetings by storm troops.

Hitler's emphasis on the state control of education is so great that much of his chapter on the state is devoted to a minutely detailed agenda of instruction. There is a good deal of talk in it about physical health and physical education: part of this is the "folkish" accent, part a literary carry-over from the Spartan scheme. But in the main Hitler's conception of the educational function of the state is Treitschkean. We are too prone to forget, being Americans and constitutionalists, the strength of the army in the German tradition and the extent to which Hitler is an army man. The young are to be taught military virtues, history bowdlerized by the drill-sergeant, duties and sacrifices. Education is to "find its culmination in branding, through instinct and reason, the race sense and race feeling into the hearts and brains of the youth." Education, in short, is to be narrowed to the purposes of the ruling group, instead of the ruling group being increasingly broadened by education. But even more: hatred is to be raised to the height of the primary educational principle, and thus the primary cohesive force in a community that has no inner principle of cohesion.

Virginia Woolf, in one of her acute critical essays, has a sentence on James Joyce that even more relevantly applies to Hitler. "A desperate man," she calls

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Joyce, "who feels that in order to breathe he must break the windows." It is not a question here of *Lebensraum* for a nation, but *Lebensraum* for one man: and not all the geographical expanse of the earth and the planetary system would ever medicine him again to a sense of sufficiency. Some men have had this fanatic desire for personal imperialism and ended either as millionaires or lunatics. Hitler's genius was political, and he had the fortune to live at a time when he could use and be used by the forces of reaction. The intellectual and psychic expression of that role may be found in "Mein Kampf."

Goering has spoken somewhere of how Hitler proceeds "with the assurance of a somnambulist." If so it is a sleep-walker who has now plunged the world into another war. What the outcome will be, for Germany as well as for the whole of humanist culture, it is too early to know. It would be a good guess, however, that Hitler's assurance has finally played him false, and fatefully so. He succeeded in Germany so long as he could manipulate his strategy so that he never encountered a superior force. That too has been the secret of his diplomatic successes. Had he been willing to wait after Munich, consolidate his gains, allow the opposition to be split by divisions, he and Nazism might have been able to postpone the reckoning a long time. But the hypnotist came finally to hypnotize himself. The symbols about German destiny and his own which he sold so successfully to the German people he finally sold to himself. He went too far to extricate himself.

What will defeat Hitlerism in the long pull is that its values are life-denying values. Rauschning has called them "nihilism," by which he means the absence of fixed principle. But it is better to call them anti-humanist. For the Rauschnings of this world, in their desire for the static and their fear of change, pick exactly the strong parts of Hitler's doctrine to oppose. What has given Hitler strength is that there is a good deal of the revolutionist in him. He has promised men to open the windows for them, and they have flocked around him for breath: only to find that when they had smashed the windows he led them into a poisoned room. It is the poison—the anti-humanism, the barbarism—which is the real indictment of Hitler: not the restless desire for change and even for personal aggrandizement. If Hitler is ever defeated it will not be the military strength of the western Allies that will defeat him but the intellectual strength of a humanism which embraces the revolutionary values as well as the permanent. It will not be the war but the peace afterward, provided (what a big proviso!) it is a humane peace and one that does not repeat the follies of Versailles. It will not be the Chamberlains that will defeat Hitler but the Thomas Manns.

MAX LERNER

India in the War

THIS WAR has been waged so far on a short front that runs from Scapa Flow to the Saar. It will leave little in the Old World unaltered before it ends. My own gaze has been fixed on India since it started, with growing anxiety. Into the last great war Indians flung themselves with a chivalrous generosity that disdained to take advantage of England's difficulties. Even Mr. Gandhi, the pacifist, turned recruiting sergeant. There was some response in the shape of a promise of a gradual advance to self-government. It was realized in the unlucky Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, which caused more irritation than satisfaction. Unrest grew and with it repression, till at the end of the war the North was on the verge of revolt, and after Amritsar, with Moslems as well as Hindus for once behind him, Mr. Gandhi led the first inexperienced attempt at civil disobedience. In the twenty years that have elapsed, India has come to maturity.

By a failure of tact and imagination the transition from peace to war was managed ill. Indians in their provinces are now self-governing. Much has been conceded but much has been withheld. There is democracy, imperfect indeed and precarious, in the life of the provinces, but over national policy Indians have no control whatever. Of this they were sharply reminded in August when Indian troops were sent, silently and without debate or the consent of their representatives, to Egypt, Aden and Singapore. This was doubtless necessary, but Indians saw themselves as pawns in an imperial game, that a white hand could move at will. Then came the passage in one rushed sitting at Westminster of an amending act that conferred on the Viceroy the most formidable emergency powers for the event of war. Finally, as the automatic consequence of events in Europe, by the Viceroy's proclamation, India entered the war as a belligerent.

The same thing had happened time and again in England's previous wars. On this occasion it did not seem to Indians a matter of course that three hundred million human beings should go to war, in consequence of a cable from London, without so much as a formal vote of assent. It was not that their sympathies were divided. Their passion is to win full democratic freedom. They have no inclination to fascism in any form: they have the best reasons for hating the Nazi doctrine of race: finally, their nationalism rendered them peculiarly sympathetic to Poland, a nation recently resurrected. They wished to give their unstinted support to the western democracies in their struggle against an evil principle. But their self-respect had been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

touched. Unfree themselves, were they to fight at England's bidding to win freedom for others?

The result of these reflections was that the working committee of the National Congress drew up a manifesto, as dignified as it was searching, which asked the Imperial Power to state its war aims, especially in their bearing on India. Was this, like the last, an imperialist war between two rival empires, or was it a war for democratic freedom? In the former case, Indians would have nothing to do with it: but if it were the latter, they would give it their wholehearted support. India was the test. The document evidently contemplated negotiation over the precise demands of the Congress, which realizes that constitutions cannot be elaborated in wartime. It made it clear, however, that India expected a promise that she shall exercise the right of self-determination when peace comes, and in the meanwhile it demanded the reality of responsible self-government. The document avoided threats, but to any reader familiar with recent history, it conveyed a clear warning of revolt.

What, precisely, did the Congress mean? One must bear in mind that only one part of the India Act of 1935 has come into effect—the relatively uncontroversial and beneficent plan for provincial autonomy. The provision for the creation of an All-India Federation, uniting the British provinces with the native states, remains in suspense, and has been formally postponed for the duration of the war. It has among Indians neither defender nor friend. The Congress resisted it and is pledged not to operate it; every other party, though in varying accents, criticized or condemned it. Even the Princes, who had welcomed it, in the end rejected it as "unacceptable." The Congress can claim that it has the nation behind it in its uncompromising rejection of the Federation scheme, since over India as a whole it won a majority at the provincial elections. It rejected the scheme because it armed the Viceroy with an unlimited power of veto, withdrew great areas of the nation's life, notably foreign policy and the army, from the narrow field in which it will be self-governing, loaded it with charges it may not touch, based its Federal Chambers on an undemocratic franchise, and finally brought in the autocratic princes as a buttress of property and reaction.

In the interval a hot campaign of revolt had sprung up among the Princes' subjects against their autocracy. What the Congress had in mind was primarily three things. First, it asked for some general statement of war aims that would offer some constructive alternative to old-world imperialism and power politics. Second, it asked that an Indian Constituent Assembly should be elected after the war to determine India's future status and constitution. Third, it wanted the reality of self-government now, in British India. It proposed for the present to ignore the Princes, since it holds that they ought not to enter any future federation until their subjects enjoy the same civil and political rights as the inhabitants of British India. At the center, in Delhi, it asked that the actual leaders of Indian opinion should become responsible ministers under the Viceroy. It also suggested that the present Legislative Assembly, which is in effect a powerless consultative body, elected on a plutocratic franchise and diluted by nominated members, should be dissolved, and re-elected on the relatively democratic provincial franchise. Several variants of that suggestion are possible and might have been accepted. What the Congress really meant was that it wished to fill the Viceroy's Council, composed today mainly of British civil servants, with Indians who enjoy the confidence of the nation. That would be an earnest of sincerity that would win India's loyal devotion at a stroke, and retain it throughout the war, however long and arduous it may be.

This was not an easy situation to face. It asked for boldness and imagination, for the Congress demanded a sudden break with tradition. But an opportunity would have been welcomed by any statesman who realized that India is "the test" of British enlightenment, not for India only, but for the whole civilized world. A victory over tradition in India would have been worth a whole armada of warplanes to the British cause. Unhappily there is only one statesman with imagination in this Cabinet, and Mr. Churchill is absorbed in hunting submarines. The response both from Delhi and London could hardly have been more inadequate. The Viceroy certainly talked to Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Nehru and other leaders of the Congress, but he then proceeded to interview with laborious industry fifty personages who claim to represent every other party, creed and interest in the Peninsula. Taken together, they are still a minority. Only the Moslems are numerous enough to deserve separate consideration, and many of them belong to the Congress Party.

The result was what one might have predicted. The majority is brushed aside, because there are minorities that dissent. That is the broad effect of Lord Linlithgow's official answer, and it was even more stridently obvious in the speeches that the Secretary for India (Lord Zetland) and the Archbishop of Canterbury delivered in the Lords. Mr. Gandhi's bitter comment: "The Viceroy's long statement simply shows that the old policy to divide and rule is to continue." One does not dispute the fact that a gulf, both wide and deep, separates the two creeds and the two cultures. But what has theology to do with factory legislation or agrarian policy, with tariffs and income tax, or with the question whether Indians shall man the trenches in Egypt and the forts at Singapore?

The reply was not, indeed, wholly negative. The Viceroy offered to form a "consultative group" of Indians with which he would discuss policy during the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

war behind closed doors. He would nominate these persons, from panels presented to him by the various parties, creeds and interests, including the autocratic Princes. As an answer to a demand for responsible self-government this was not well inspired. The second concession was even less happy. The Viceroy recognized that the India Act (half of it a dead letter) will probably have to be revised after the war. Again he offered consultation with all the creeds, parties, interests and Princes—meaning presumably another Round Table Conference. That method cannot succeed. If you start by hand-picking and isolating every distinguishable shade of belief and interest, no majority will emerge. Every group of Indians was represented at the last conference save the colossal peasant mass. Clearly what is contemplated is that, after fruitless debates, once more Whitehall shall draft and Westminster shall legislate. That is the opposite of self-determination.

The reader will know the sequel, which the writer views with dread. I believe that the Congress is determined and that in its own way it will conduct its own war for freedom and democracy. I have seen one campaign of civil disobedience: I shudder at the possibility of another. The British nation, preoccupied with submarines and bombing raids, and alert to every move at Moscow, has not yet realized that anything is happening in India. When the facts penetrate, it will react with more generosity than its ruling class has shown. British imperialism survives, but it is a spent force in retreat. It is not the aggressive and conscienceless brute-mass that fell on Poland. It will err, but when it has erred, it will do what it has always done from Burke's day to this. It will freely discuss its own wrongdoing.

London (by air mail) H. N. BRAILSFORD

Buying "Good Will" in Latin America

ELABORATE PLANS are evidently under way in Washington for dealing with the vast sums owed by Latin Americans to investors in this country, of which about 70 percent are now in default. Mr. Roosevelt and his aides profess a good deal of irritation at the slowness of the efforts heretofore made to find a basis for refunding this debt. Apparently the government intends to step in, make a sweeping stroke of some sort, and having thus cleared the ground, embark on its project for huge new loans. Last spring, the sum the President had in mind was $500,000,000. Lately, he has been talking about $100,000,000 in the form of loans through the Export-Import Bank. Yet even $100,000,000 is quite a lot of money to give to a gang of dictators in order to keep South America safe for democracy. "Give," moreover, is the right word, even though the money, in accordance with the protocol of international finance, is to be called a "credit" or a "loan." "Dictators" is the right word too, even though the comic-opera political pretenses of the South American nations allow most of the dictators to call themselves presidents.

The South American nations are already in default on something more than a billion dollars' worth of United States loans, floated by private bankers in the golden glow of the twenties. The collapse of 1929 ended all that, and in the years following, "revolutions" in South America and Senate investigations in the United States confirmed the South American nations in the belief that they had been tricked into an Atlas-load of debt by a high-powered combination of political graft and Wall Street chicanery. Why should they pay such debts, they argued (among themselves); especially since nobody, not even England, was paying debts any more?

Presumably some of the money now being handed out by the federal government to South America will go to resume payment on those defaulted loans. Brazil, which has received around $120,000,000 in loans and credits in the past two years, has generously deposited with the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council an amount equal to less than one-third of one percent of the $359,000,000 she owes us. It has been too accurately referred to as a token payment. The cold fact seems to be that the United States Government, in a roundabout way, is assuming partial responsibility for the bad loans Wall Street made in its more expansive days. Of course, State Department and business proponents of the scheme do not put it so baldly. They say that the new federal loans will be used to "stabilize the currencies" of the various nations, and to "provide credits" for the purchase of more American exports. Theoretically, when the South American currencies are sufficiently stabilized, and when American exports are pouring in, the South American nations will be rich, prosperous and anxious to repay not only the old but the new debts. Theoretically.

Now the economic collapse which brought about the defaults on American loans had, of course, political repercussions, and a number of old South American dictators were toppled from power. This does not mean that the epidemic of "revolutions" in South America in the early 1930's was symptomatic of a real change of government. In several instances, the leaders were changed. Nowhere did the government change. Everywhere except in Chile—where the outcome is still uncertain—the government remained in the hands of the small ruling caste which has kept tight hold ever since the passing of the viceroys. This group, the large land-owners, own all the good land (and land,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not stocks or bonds, is the real wealth of South America); they have a practical monopoly of education; and they run their countries exclusively for their own benefit. This ruling caste amounts to only seven percent of the whole population; but so firm is its control that the vast masses of the population are to all purposes voiceless, voteless, utterly submerged.

It is this little group of self-confessed dictators and so-called presidents and the small but all-powerful class they represent that the United States Government proposes to help by handing over further credits and loans. In no sense can these governments be said to express the will of the people. The only will they represent is the will of the ruling caste to remain in power. And so they use the money they get in foreign loans to pay off political henchmen, to build handsome government buildings, to beautify capital cities, for their own benefit. They don't use the money for schools and country roads and public health. It's better if the people don't know too much.

Dr. Inman quotes a Chilean of Santiago as saying: "See the nice presents your widows and orphans have made us," pointing to the marble skyscrapers put up for government office buildings. "We do not really need them; you see that they are not by any means completely occupied; but it was nice of you to treat us so kindly." In Brazil the loans of the twenties went to the coffee growers, the Brazilian aristocracy, who promptly grew more coffee, and then had to have more loans to provide means of storing the tremendous surpluses, and later spent still more money to cart the coffee out to sea and dump it. Leguía's vaunted public works in Peru were primarily roads and buildings in and around the capital, Lima, and were in many cases so flimsily constructed by grafting politicians that they began to disintegrate almost as soon as the dictator had fallen. As one skeptical but shrewd observer put it: "It cost the United States a hundred million dollars to lose the friendship of Peru, when she might have lost it for nothing."

The administration has said nothing to indicate that it has any plan in mind to prevent the recurrence of exactly this sort of thing with the proposed new loans. And the objections so far raised to the plan by members of Congress are concerned primarily with cutting down the amount of money to be tossed away, and not with anything more constructive. This seems to be due in large part to the fact that Washington has been obsessed by the idea that we must *do* something to stop the much touted Nazi and Fascist penetration in South America. The emotional appeal of this argument has been such that it prevents any careful scrutiny of the problem.

There are, however, many reasons to believe that the "fascist penetration" of South America has been greatly overdone by the American press. It is sufficient to note here that German trade gains in South America were made at the expense of British rather than American trade; and that Germany's trade position before the present war was just about back to the 1914 level. Such a competent observer as Mr. Julian Greenup, the American Commercial Attaché at Lima, writes in a recent report that the purchase of a few European airplanes by Peru is widely noted in the American press, while no mention is made of the far greater number of American planes sold, and no indication is given of the fact that European planes have been reported to give unsatisfactory service. Mr. Franklin Johnston, publisher of The American Exporter, recently returned from a tour of South America with the comment that the totalitarian nations get the headlines but the United States gets the business.

Furthermore, it is well known that Germany has no money to lend or spend abroad. All the Nazis could do, even before the British blockade, was to ship the South American dictators planes and munitions and such in return for raw materials. This was convenient for the dictators, for they need military equipment to maintain their regimes in power, and every South American country desperately needs to dispose of the raw materials which they all have in such abundance. As long as Germany was able to provide goods that South America wanted in return for South American products, there was bound to be a certain amount of this barter trade, loans or no loans. Now that Germany presumably cannot continue to supply the things that South America wants in return for its cotton and coffee and wheat and meat, South America will buy whatever it wants and can afford from us, loans or no loans.

In either case, all the credits in the world will do little to change the trade situation in South America. True, the credits we propose may enable American exporters to sell a few more goods, which United States taxpayers will pay for. But the plan completely overlooks the need of the South American countries to dispose of *their* goods. So long as we don't *buy* more South American products, South America will continue to try to barter some of those products elsewhere. If we do plan to buy more South American products, why not use the "loan" money for that instead of subsidizing a few United States exporters with it?

Thus our system of providing credits entirely ignores the problem of South America's need for markets. Moreover, it does not even solve the problem it purports to solve by creating a wider market in South America for American products. The South American governments and the small ruling caste (only seven percent of the whole population, remember) are the only groups in South America that have the money to buy or the taste to demand imported products of any kind. And providing more credits for these groups is never going to open up the real mass-production market that lies dormant in the other 93 percent.

The only way to open up this market is to increase the purchasing power of the great submerged masses.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Two-thirds of all the people in South America are illiterate peons, tenant farmers, agricultural laborers bound to the great estates like medieval serfs. Often the peons on the great estates receive no money wage at all, but live completely outside a money economy. Even the small group of factory workers are almost outside the purchasing pale. In Argentina, for example, government statistics show that the average workingman with a family in Buenos Aires does not earn enough for minimum requirements of food, rent and clothing.

If we want to be realistic in dealing with the twin problem of creating new markets for our industry and scotching the Nazi snake to the south of us, we shall not just hand out money when South American governments come wheedling and whimpering about the Nazi threat. Any good dictator can work up a sizable Nazi scare if it is going to be worth a few millions to him in loans. What we should rather do is to say: "We don't blame you a bit for being worried about the Nazi penetration. We worry about it, too. But we know that the best and in fact the only possible way to prevent the spread of fascism is to have an intelligent, well educated population, well supplied with the material benefits which democracy at its best can offer. And if you really want help to check the Nazi menace *that* way, we'll give it to you gladly."

Then we should require any South American government which wants a loan or a credit to present a carefully detailed project showing exactly what the money is to be spent for. It should not go to repay American investors, taken in by Wall Street fifteen years ago; that responsibility, if it is to be shouldered by anyone, belongs to Wall Street far more than to the federal government. Nor should such money be broadly labeled "for public works." If it is to go for road construction, we should insist that the roads be in rural regions where communications are now almost nonexistent, instead of for paving the streets of capital cities or building military roads for the convenience of dictators. We should insist that it go for housing, not for grandiose government buildings; for public health; and most of all for schools and teachers to supply the rural education which is everywhere in South America an appalling need.

Such a program, based on South American realities, would not be simply "throwing good money after bad." It would eventually bring into the economic system and so into the marketplace thousands of potential customers for our exporters. But, far more important, it would really give democracy a chance to come to life in South America. *That* would be worth several million dollars.

KATHERINE RODELL

How Big Should the Farm Be?

THE MOST ALLURING REMEDY for economic depression has always been a return to the land. It doesn't matter whether those who have been deprived of their former means of living have farms, or money to buy them, whether they know anything about farming, whether suitable land is available, or whether there are already more people on the land than can make a living there. The assumption seems to be that there is some peculiar quality inherent in the soil that will make up for all these deficiencies.

In keeping with this naïve philosophy, it is assumed that the farms to which the industrial outcasts go will be small, that they will be worked with the simplest tools, and that production will be primarily, if not exclusively, for home consumption. Such matters as doctors' services, the education of children, payment of taxes, suitable clothing, healthful recreation, are conveniently ignored.

The prevalence of these and similar fallacies with regard to farm economics compels the adoption of certain assumptions in a discussion of the most economical farm unit—assumptions that could be easily justified if space permitted. It will be assumed that (1) the land shall be so distributed as to supply the needs of the nation for agricultural products, at the least possible expenditure of labor or capital, and with due regard to the conservation of soil and moisture; (2) in each case the farm must be large enough to enable its operator to make a decent living; (3) the crops planted will be adapted to soil, climate and market conditions; (4) there will be no restrictions on the sale or exchange of products; (5) all available labor-saving devices and methods will be employed, and (6) only under these conditions can farming be a good way of living.

From these assumptions it follows that there can be no "best" size for a farm. It follows that the question whether the farm, in any given instance, is to be large or small must be answered primarily on the grounds of efficiency. Surface, contour, soil, climate, the kind of crops grown, character and volume of the labor supply and available markets will be the chief factors.

Successful farm operation can be accurately measured only in terms of net returns per farm, or, where the farmer or the farm family does all the work, in terms of net income per worker. But since data for comparison on this basis are not available, the best that can be done is to compare on the basis of gross income per farm, or per farm worker.

The highest gross income per farm worker, in 1929, was in the Pacific Coast States, where it was $2,940, as compared with $624 in the East-South-Central region, and $1,824 in New England. Gross income per acre

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

varied from $27 in the West-South-Central region to $96 in New England. Average crop acres per worker varied from sixteen in the East-South-Central to ninety-four in the West-North-Central region. In New England, the average area cropped was thirty-two acres, while in the Southwest it was sixty-four acres.

It is thus apparent that it was not the difference in the size of the farms but the difference in the number of crop acres handled per worker that chiefly accounted for the variation in gross income per worker. The high gross income per farm in New England is due to additional factors; notably a large labor and fertilizer input, a comparatively high degree of mechanization, crop specialization and favorable market conditions.

An examination of particular farm enterprises confirms the foregoing evidence, tending to show that the size of the economical farm will vary. Prior to the depression, Thomas Campbell, in Montana, was farming nearly 100,000 acres, under a system of management as strictly efficient as could be found in any business enterprise. His men worked eight-hour shifts and were paid wages higher than were paid by most industrial employers. His farms were completely mechanized, and proved methods of seed selection, soil treatment and cultivation were employed. Apple orchards of several hundred acres in the Shenandoah Valley; large citrus orchards in Florida and in California; a 25,000-acre rice farm in Louisiana; a half-million-acre hay and cattle ranch in Montana; large mechanized cotton farms in Texas and Oklahoma and in certain areas in the old South have conclusively proved the profitableness of large-scale farming under efficient management, by the use of modern methods and equipment adapted to natural conditions.

Louis Bertrand, of western Kansas, farmed 8,000 acres of wheat land using twelve tractor-drawn combines in the harvesting of his wheat. So efficient were his operations that only 66.6 days of man-labor were required for all operations—about 4.2 minutes of man-labor per bushel. Contrast this with the sixty to eighty hours required per acre before the beginning of farm mechanization in America, or with the three hours per bushel of wheat produced on a modern French peasant farm.

There are equally impressive examples of successful operation of comparatively small farms. Russell Lord, in that fascinating book, "Men of Earth," gives an account of an Ohio farmer who went in for specialties running all the way from goldfish to colored water lilies, who employed from thirty to sixty persons on 142 acres, and netted as high as $100,000 a year. A farmer near Frederick, Maryland, makes a good income from forty-four acres, rotated on eleven acres of sweet corn. The gross income from this farm averaged $100 per acre in pre-depression years.

It has been noted that the gross income per farm and per farm worker is high in New England, though the acreage cultivated is comparatively small. Small citrus farms have in many instances been very successful, and the same is true of fruit and vegetable farms in other areas where soil, climate and market conditions are favorable. Naturally, acreages are smaller where these crops are grown, especially in irrigated districts.

On the other hand, the small farms of sharecroppers in the old South, as well as the small farms of the white inhabitants of the southern Appalachians, yield extremely meager incomes. But this cannot be ascribed wholly to the fact that the farms are small. Under existing land and market conditions, it is impossible to make a decent living from farming in these regions on farms of any size.

Where farming is conducted on a family-subsistence basis, the man-labor requirement for equal quantities will be higher than where production is specialized. The plots devoted to each item in the family budget must necessarily be small, excess acreage must be planted in order to assure against low yields, and it is impossible for the subsistence farmer to attain high proficiency in the care of each of the several crops. For these and other reasons, subsistence farming is necessarily high-cost farming—so high, in fact, that any considerable expansion of it would plunge the nation into unendurable poverty. It has been estimated that in 1929 there were more than 400,000 "self-sufficient" farms in the United States. The average gross income from all sources of these farms was approximately $425, as compared with $1,760 for all farms. At the average for the "self-sufficient" farms, it would have required more than 26,000,000 farms to produce the value that was produced in 1929. At an average of two workers to the farm, the labor requirement would have been equal to our entire labor force. To produce the materials for what the Department of Agriculture estimates to be a liberal budget, more than 100,000,000 workers would be required, if all farms were on a subsistence basis.

As to the future, there are causes at work that may completely transform agricultural methods. It appears that imperatively needed soil-conservation policies require that over a considerable part of the wheat and corn belts, more land will have to be devoted to forage or pasture and less to harvested crops. This will probably tend in the course of time to increase the size of farms in these areas. On the other hand, agricultural science is demonstrating that acre yields may be greatly increased, by proper seed selection, soil treatment and use of fertilizer. And this is not all. Agrobiologists estimate "perultimate" yields at nine times the actual average for corn, 11.9 times for wheat, 13.2 times for oats and 14.7 times for cotton.

This would greatly increase the output per worker or per family on a given acreage, or, conversely, reduce the acreage required for a given output. If the pen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ultimate yields could be realized, 15 acres of corn, 25 acres of wheat, 13 acres of oats or 8.7 acres of cotton would yield a gross income of $2,000 at the price averages of 1926-30, if available efficiencies of cultivation were used.

Thus the small farm, whether for profit, for the family living, for the supplementing of income from other sources, or as an avocation, may yet come into its own. But the small farm of the future will be a very different thing from the existing peasant farms of the old world, which too often are taken as models by those who seek security in isolation, and who would cure the ills incident to economic growth by tearing it out by the roots.

WILLIAM G. ROYLANCE

It's a Wise Father

ANASTASIA PETROVNA was peeved. Three times her seventh child had died, and now the old man was no good any more, and she could see those 2,000 rubles in government premiums for the seventh living child slip through her fingers for good and all.

She tried praying for a while, as her mother had taught her, but she must have been out of practice after all these years, because the old man didn't get any better; just kept on working in the mine, getting drunk on his free day, and for two days every payday. He even took to going to a lot of meetings in the evenings, and was elected to the Alchevskoye city soviet, and once sent to Kharkov as a delegate. But he didn't make any more children. Anastasia gave up praying and swore at him in Ukrainian, but still nothing happened.

"Something has got to be done," Anastasia reflected, "or it will be too late." She didn't know just how old she was, but it must have been pretty close to fifty. Obviously there was one solution, and in her spare moments Anastasia looked over the barracks where they lived for possible recruits. Her attention was caught by Comrade Alexandr, down the hall, who was the janitor of the club house. He was still young, and might be willing to turn an honest ruble or two.

Comrade Alexandr shrugged his shoulders. "Why not," he said, "1,000 rubles for you, 1,000 for me."

That was an ugly turn of events. Anastasia used all her powers of persuasion, and demonstration. After lengthy discussion, with descriptions of the difficulties of delivery, Comrade Alexandr broke down.

"All right, 500 for me, 1,500 for you," he agreed.

In due course the baby was born, and after the usual delays, excuses and signatures, Anastasia received her 2,000 rubles, with the congratulations of the Alchevskoye trade-union council.

"How about my money?" asked Comrade Alexandr the next day in the corridor of the barracks.

"*Yaki dingi*—what money?" She shrugged one shoulder and grinned. But Comrade Alexandr was mad. The goods had been delivered, and first-quality goods at that, and now payment was refused. After several more unsuccessful attempts to get his money from Anastasia he took the case to the Alchevskoye People's Court and opened suit. In due time the two parties received the official court summons and appeared together with as many of the local population as could squeeze into the rickety wooden structure. Some people even came all the way from Voroshilovgrad.

Comrade Alexandr pleaded his case in stentorian tones, sparing none of the details.

When the judge called on Anastasia, however, instead of pleading, she produced five hundred rubles from her blouse and gave them to her accomplice with a flourish and a sly grin.

Comrade Alex was pleased and embarrassed. "Comrade Judge," he said, moving the money back and forth from one hand to the other, "I withdraw my suit."

The judge stood up with a twinkle in his eye. "But we," he said, as Anastasia snickered, "have a few words to say. You, Comrade Alexandr, will pay 30 percent of your monthly wages to Anastasia Petrovna for the support of your child, as is provided for by law, for eighteen years until the child is of age."

Anastasia laughed out loud now, and the court laughed with her.

Moscow

JOHN STEVENS

To a Molecule

Beneath the statue lies the stone,
Behind the form the substance lurks,
You are my flesh and blood and bone
You are mankind and all its works.
The hardness of the builder's beam,
The greenness of the summer's grass,
And men and gods are dust and dream
While your eternal seconds pass.

In you the shrine but not the prayer;
In you the arms but not the cross.
The rose but not its beauty there,
The matter's gain, the meaning's loss.
The star and snail are one to you,
The snail and star alike must be,
And life and death are filtered through
Your idiot identity.

You are my death, for in you I
Admit myself a transient thing,
Behold what lingers when I die,
My end and your continuing.
The ash that mocks the fire's flame,
The husk that is the harvest's yield,
And of man's miracle the shame,
And of his soul the potter's field.

E. D. KENNEDY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Washington Notes

Panamanian Patriots

THE CIRCUMSTANCES surrounding the proposal of the United States Lines to transfer their ships to Panamanian registry are unexplained as these Notes are written. Candor on the part of the administration would appear to be needed. Mr. Hull says that the affair was a complete surprise to him, that he first heard of it at a State Department press conference. His word is beyond question.

But, on the other hand, the United States Maritime Commission says that the request of the United States Lines was passed upon by the State Department before it itself considered it, that it received the State Department's explicit "clearance." A responsible spokesman for the Maritime Commission has categorically denied to this writer that the "clearance" came from the usual State Department sub-officials who deal with shipping matters. According to this spokesman, the Maritime Commission was acutely aware that a question of fundamental policy was involved, and, accordingly, "clearance" was obtained from an official who had the requisite authority and was in the closest communication with Mr. Roosevelt. The description seems to point to either Assistant Secretary Berle, who worked with Mr. Roosevelt in drafting the neutrality proclamation, or Under-Secretary Welles.

Here we are faced with what appears to be a new outcropping of the old feud between the Hull faction and the Roosevelt-Welles-Berle faction in the State Department. This seems to me much more serious than the transfer of American ships to Panama's gay, delicately colored flag. The row between Secretary of War Woodring and Assistant Secretary Johnson, in which the White House has intermittently and whimsically taken sides, is a Washington scandal. The Navy Department has no official civilian head at all, a consequence of which has been continuous changes in the design of new warships, sometimes even after they had been launched. The State, War and Navy Departments are those immediately concerned with the world emergency, and Mr. Roosevelt has no more pressing task than to instil unity and loyalty in them.

The United States Lines episode illustrates a very old copybook maxim: that subsidies to private business men mean dubious, if not actually corrupt, politics. By granting a subsidy, a government does not acquire a whiphand over an industry. On the contrary, it provides business men with a dollars-and-cents motive for going into politics on a luxurious scale. Before you know it, they are pushing the government around. As has been told earlier in these Notes, the elimination of American shipping from the North Atlantic in wartime is no new proposal. It was agreed upon when the ship-subsidy program was put forward two years ago, and shipping companies supposedly consented to it. According to plan, English and French ships were to replace ours on the North Atlantic, and ours were to take over their routes in other parts of the world. Immediately after the present neutrality act was approved, members of the South African government said at Capetown they hoped American ships could be sent to relieve the developing shortage there. But the United States Lines and other American companies, as they have frankly said, want now to stay in the North Atlantic, with its high and risky profits.

You may recall that the original shipping amendments to the neutrality act, drafted by Senators Pittman and Bailey, would have prevented American vessels from entering the Mediterranean—a restriction that, in view of reports that German submarines are operating off the Canary Islands, did not seem unreasonable. Hardly had these amendments been introduced in the Senate, however, when this writer was informed by a shipping lobbyist that the prohibition on the Mediterranean was certain to be removed. The Maritime Commission, he said mysteriously had made representations in the necessary quarters. No only that, but arrangements were being worked out t permit American ships to trade with neutral countries i the actual war zone, Belgium, Holland, Eire and Scandinavia. Reasonable proof that such a scheme was seriously considered is given by Mr. Pittman's announcement, the day the neutrality law was enacted, that American ships on the North Atlantic would carry secret signs, to be communicated to the German government and changed after each voyage, by which German submarines would be able to identify them as bona-fide American vessels. Apparently this scheme was abandoned for the simple device of transferring ships to Panamanian registry. Administration officials, however, seem to have forgotten to notify Mr. Pittman that the team's signals had been changed.

Presidential politics, especially on the Democratic side, have reached an Alice in Wonderland stage. Take the superficially fantastic case of Senator Burt Wheeler, whom Mr. John L. Lewis, in his recent letter condemning the proposed eleven-state Western conference, called a great liberal. Apparently Mr. Wheeler is a serious presidential candidate, but upon what does he base his hopes? He comes from a sparsely populated state, Montana, with a negligible convention vote. He may obtain pledged delegations from neighboring states, notably Colorado; even so, when the convention opens, his vote will be very small. The only important anti-Roosevelt strength, most observers agree, will be that of Mr. Garner, who may conceivably have two hundred, perhaps more, delegates. It is almost mathematically demonstrable that Mr. Wheeler's hope must rest on the possibility that, once the Garner boom falters, he will be the legatee of the Garner delegates. Mr. Lewis is thus backing a candidate who can win only through an understanding of sorts with what he once called a "poker-playing, whiskey-drinking, labor-baiting, evil old man."

The writer has no authority to interpret Mr. Lewis' motives. Nevertheless, from a professional politician's viewpoint, Mr. Lewis' course takes on a wholly different color. It must be assumed that he has not forgotten Mr. Roosevelt's remark about a plague o' both your houses during the strike in Little Steel, nor Mr. Roosevelt's persistent refusal to recognize any moral distinction between the CIO and the AFL. Mr. Roosevelt, if he desires a third term, is likely to dominate next year's convention like a colossus. The only way in which a minority group like the CIO can hope to exercise pressure on him, to obtain Democratic pledges, is to pursue the same strategy of feint and threat that Mr. Lewis is now following.

Washington T. R. B.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Other People's Money

Professors on the Payroll

ONE IS BOUND to like the fine spirit behind a suggestion which is made by a happily unnamed college professor. It is a proposal for exposing the professors to what is called the "American way." It seems that the American way is something the poor professor does not know about. Whatever it is, it is supposed to be something they know about in institutions like M. I. T. and other engineering colleges and, I suppose, schools of business. Harvard, one gathers, knows a little about it, but of course not so much as M. I. T. This lack of understanding by the professor of the American way is something which brings criticism down on his head—criticism of business men. So the professor I shall quote has a suggestion for curing his less sapient colleagues.

"It has always been my opinion," says the good doctor who wants to put matters to rights, "that while some of this criticism might be justified, business generally has not made many overtures to the college professors. If advertising agencies and advertisers generally had offered summer employment to teachers of advertising, I believe that many beneficial results would have followed." I find this quoted in Business Week. The doctor really is on solid ground there. Look at the results that followed when the utility industries gave the professors summer employment and even night work. And see what excellent results followed when the investment bankers' association gave employment to certain college professors. The speed with which a college professor or a preacher or even a poor dumb newspaperman catches on to the American way when he is subjected to a semester or two or even a summer's sojourn on the payroll is amazing.

The suggestion certainly fell on fertile soil in the mind of the Business Week commentator. "It is in the departments of sociology and economics," he says, "that the big job is to be done. It is the influence of these faculties that will make itself felt in the relations of business with the government and the consumer. . . . In saying this I am thinking not only of the job business would do on the professors in the course of such employment. I am thinking of the job the professors might do *for* the business men. For it becomes more and more clear that the professors are getting the inside track, not only in molding the opinions of youth, but also in crystallizing popular sentiments and inspiring governmental viewpoints."

It is a noble and inspiring proposal. Only it leaves you a little in the dark as to what the American way is. All that is clear is that it is located somewhere near the cash drawer.

The TNEC was shocked almost into insensibility this week by the world-shattering revelation that steel companies in the United States confer on the price of "extras" in steel products. No one, I take it, would credit this amazing fact if the revelation had not come in the form of an admission by Mr. Benjamin Fairless, president of the U. S. Steel Corporation.

Who would have believed, in the absence of this testimony, that the handful of steelmasters in the United States ever got together on prices? Isn't there a law against that? Bids on steel products to the government itself have come in from many companies agreeing to the last decimal. This, of course, has been a mere coincidence. And since it has happened over and over again, it has been a case of coincidence after coincidence.

In the good old days when Bryan and Wilson and Borah and La Follette were denouncing collusion among the trusts no corporation official would ever admit that he so much as whispered the word price in the presence of a competitor. But ever since the anti-trust laws were junked by the NRA and then later even more effectively junked by Attorney General Cummings, corporation officials have become more chatty about these things.

It is only a few weeks ago that someone in the TNEC expressed the belief that we would have to get around to a double standard in competition. That is, we would have to recognize that there are certain industries where the government must let the producers get together and arrange little things like prices and production. As a matter of fact, we have already gotten around to that in the Guffey Act and the milk industry. And certainly no one has been bothering the steel industry or the building-materials manufacturers save the Federal Trade Commission—and it has no power to prosecute. The Department of Justice is, I understand, busy on this subject now—seven years after the Republicans were thrown out. But at the very moment when the Department of Justice gets busy, other officials of the government begin to talk about a double standard of anti-trust enforcement. We are, I assume, to have male trusts and female trusts and the males are going to be allowed a little more ranging space in the social code, but the females will have to be virtuous. The Steel Corporation has always been decidedly masculine.

The South is getting ready to put another crop of cotton on the market. It will have about 11,900,000 bales to sell. It would apparently have no great difficulty doing this, since this country and its foreign customers can absorb that much. But there are 10,100,000 bales of cotton raised in other years in storage. It is held by the government, which has made loans to farmers, taking these 10,100,000 bales as collateral. That makes 22,000,000 bales in the supply, which is almost twice as much as we can sell. Despite this fact, the government has announced that any farmer who wishes to hold his cotton instead of selling it—hold it for higher prices—can borrow 8.3 cents a pound and the government will take over his cotton and make another addition to that vast overhanging surplus.

That supply has the world cotton market practically ruined. It is costing about $45,000,000 a year just to store it, while the policy of holding prices above the world market has ruined the foreign market of the cotton farmer and just about wrecked the cotton farmer himself. The policy of paying subsidies and making loans to all the business people in America who are not getting along is a very simple one. Any industry or enterprise can be made to go on forever by simply handing out to the farmer or the grocer or the steamship company or the railroad or the restaurateur enough money to cover his deficit. But is anyone under any illusions about this actually making the economic system work?

JOHN T. FLYNN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French and Indians

AS A FILM that neither attempts more than it can do nor is satisfied with the trivial, "Port of Shadows" is a pleasure. It was made in France by Marcel Carné; and apart from the thrills and satisfactions of its story, it is one of those things an occasional French film-maker does so perfectly: an atmosphere created, a mood unbroken. The scene is Le Havre under a fog, and the lower depths of town at that; but dim lighting and mean walls are not enough in themselves to establish an atmosphere, which is rather a compound of story, its meaning, its people, the scene and tempo of the action, what is said or unsaid, all in the right emphasis.

There are very few things here: a street, a shop, a few angles of the docks, the two rooms of a waterfront deadfall, a bar. But these simplicities, as well as the sustained blacks, grays and 15-watt yellows of the setting, are kept from monotony by the shift of interest and the good balance of contrasts. There is even a carnival scene, its brief whirl and tinsel as sad as small carnivals always are, and therefore wholly apt to the meaning. There is aptness in costumes and sets, and the camera work which realizes them. In addition, the picture has the best use (though not recording) of dramatic sound—as opposed to the sound of pistol shots and composer's background—that can be found anywhere outside of Hitchcock. The sad and aimless guitar player behind his empty bar; the pretty chimes on the shop door; and (best) the choir music always flooding from a radio set in the house of murder. From the guitar and the intercutting of the woman's scream and the steamboat whistle, it is clear that M. Carné has studied Hitchcock more than casually. This is nothing against him, for while Hitchcock is the man who can teach them all on the subject of music as an active theatrical force, most of those who have studied how he did what, have neglected to study why.

"Port of Shadows" is a love story, one of the best. The plot is lively but soon told. An army deserter trying to skip the country; a young girl wiser if not better than she should be, trying to run away from a repulsive but pitifully amorous guardian; the presence of a nicely assorted trio of petty mobsters. The girl meets the soldier, both creatures of knocks and bruises, mutually suspicious at first, and then presently, why not? In less than forty-eight hours the different forces have got mixed up, and write your own conclusion. The conclusion of the picture is that there is a little kindness in the world—not enough to go around and never where you would expect to find it—too often unrecognized, but genuine, and when felt as such, beautiful to see: the silly stumblebum, the host of the ginmill, the suicidal painter. The beauty of this picture is partly in this quiet statement of non-spectacular truth, but even more in the steadfast allegiance of each character to his own strength and weakness (no Wallace Beery evil whiskers and heart of gold; no Victor McLaglen transformation). When goodness gets to this surface, it has been a pitched battle, and worth it. Because virtue did not triumph by some flick of the wrist in the scenario department, the majority will find the picture depressing—though with the world as it is, you'd think any story proving there is virture in it at all would be a token of joy and welcome. Times change, as it is only right they should, but I will take this treatment of love as the sudden hope of heaven, between a roughened man and a scared young woman, before any Romeos or Juliets, even as played in double exposure by Orson Welles.

But the perception and craftsman's skill of story and direction would not be the same without the final eloquence of this group of players, each filling his part and none ambitious to swell beyond it: the occasionals, the character people and the principals. There were Delmont, Aimois, Genin; there was Pierre Brasseur in a difficult mixture of fear and tough bravado; and there was Michel Simon, who managed many effects without giving away to the audience what all concerned suspected him of. As the girl, Michele Morgan was both lovely and secure in the meaning of the part, a little too old for the given age, but one of the few who could establish the fact that a death for love might not be so fantastic after all. The picture's mainspring is of course Jean Gabin, who is a true stalwart—indeed, it would be difficult to imagine the effect of this picture if he had not been there through all its minutes with his projection of strength in immobility, his command of the illusion that crossing a room even to get to the men's room has its meaning and that if he kicks a dog it will be because he loves the mutt. There is something we know no more about than magnets, some inner command, some emanation of qualities that would be destroyed if talked about. There is a feeling of dignity that is more than his own—the dignity of all men—who are after all men and have dignity in some degree whether their surface foibles make fools of them or not. Gabin and all the qualities of the film around him have that perfect eloquence of the thing as perceived, marked down and brought across to all who have an interest in and hope for the processes of life, as lived.

"Drums Along the Mohawk" is a candy-colored period bit, nice enough in general but nothing to break your neck getting to. Life in upstate New York during the Revolution. Since John Ford directed it, it is well above the average historical picture, but not up to Mr. Ford's best. There are too many type situations and too many types—ugh-ugh-Indian, hell's-fire army widow, little feller with big jug, etc. And except for the skirmishes, the action is pretty slow.

But when the skirmishes happen there is plenty of fun. It is good to have a lot of Indians milling around in a picture shooting arrows and everything, and now that sound has been added to catch the unearthly rumpus they make, the effect is complete—the audience practically saves that fort with the arms of its seats. Henry Fonda and Claudette Colbert and some good supporting people make very nice going of it; and there is a scattering of handsome picture bits both in action and in the humor of community life. These you can spot as director's work if only because Edna May Oliver is in some of them, and restrained, and restraint is not brought to Miss Oliver until you sit on her head. There are touching things too, and instruction and blood. Perhaps if you can manage to break it only a little bit, you may wish to break your neck getting to see the film after all.

OTIS FERGUSON

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Bandwagon

"Herr Hitler at once intervened to observe that things were different 125 years ago. I said not as far as England is concerned." – *Ambassador Nevile Henderson in the British War Blue Book.*

Whether his prices are outrageous or entirely reasonable, it is to the advantage of any night-spot proprietor to advertise that people on his premises are all paying like grand dukes, and that folk who acknowledge the existence of anything as microscopic as the five-dollar banknote better stay away or, at most, stand and spend it at the bar and not expect to mingle with the paying guests on the dance floor. – *From Lucius Beebe's syndicated column.*

Camel Bites Needle's Eye

H. Gordon Selfridge, American-born London merchant, painted a gloomy picture for the future of individual enterprise upon return to his native land. . . . Higher taxes may make the world better for "the underdog," he declared, "but the man with enterprise and initiative has no chance. It is a very unhappy world." – *From an A. P. interview, printed in The Florida Times-Union.*

Is Moscow's Square Red!

"The causes which were instrumental in shaping public approval for the adoption of the seventeenth amendment were no doubt engineered by the invisible government to bring about what we have today—a 'democracy,' or communistic state." – *Remarks by Congressman Thorkelson as reported in The Congressional Record.*

Old Marse Sullivan Scoops the News

U. S. Striving for Neutrality
by Unprecedented Self-Denial
– Mark Sullivan

9 U. S. Ships to Fly Panama Flag
to Get World Trade

– *Two headlines in the November 7 New York Herald Tribune.*

Feet-of-Clay Department

The editors of Fortune do not know how long the War of 1939 is going to last. – *Statement in the November Fortune.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column and $1 will be paid for each item used. Address The Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

Correspondence

A Job for the FBI

SIR: I think that the editors of The New Republic would be doing a great service to the American people by making an investigation to determine how many members of Congress, how many members of the Roosevelt retinue, and how many other persons in influential government posts have bought stocks in airplane factories and in arms and munitions works during the recent past weeks to profit in dollars by the repeal of the present (as of November 2, 1939) neutrality law.

Washington, D. C. HENRY STONER

Do Little Corporations Make Money?

SIR: In the course of his review of E. D. Kennedy's "Dividends to Pay" in your issue of November 1, Fred Rodell attacks my own review of the Kennedy volume in The New York Times. Mr. Rodell first misstates a point I made and then attempts to dispose of it. I was concerned to show that the statistical methods used by Mr. Kennedy to arrive at his results were fallacious. Mr. Rodell—implicitly, though not candidly—grants the validity of one of my chief criticisms, but goes on to argue that it does not make any difference, because even when Mr. Kennedy's error is allowed for, his comparisons still show that companies with less than $1,000,000 incomes earned less in 1929 than in 1925.

The statistical fallacy to which I called attention, however, as I tried to indicate, was only one of many in Mr. Kennedy's comparisons. In view of Mr. Rodell's attempt at defense, it is worth while calling attention as an example to one more of these, though there are still others no less important. No true direct comparison can be made between the net income of large and of small companies—particularly of net income as reported for tax purposes. Most of the small companies for which Mr. Kennedy's heart seems to bleed at times are closely held, often one-man companies, managed by their owners. These owners pay themselves salaries. To avoid paying a high corporation tax on net income and then another tax when they receive the income as dividends, they prefer to take their corporation income direct in the form of salary. The effect of this practice is enlightening. In the calendar year 1936, according to the Treasury figures, the highest bracket of corporations shown, those with total assets of more than $100,000,000 each reported a combined total net income of $2,716,000,000. Officers' salaries paid by these big corporations came to $79,000,000, or less than three percent of net income. The lowest bracket of corporations shown in the Treasury figures, however, those with total assets of under $50,000, showed a net *loss* of $101,000,000, *but paid their officers salaries of $679,000,000*, or more than six times the "loss" of the corporations and more than eight times the amount paid to officers of the corporations with total assets of more than $100,000,000. This comparison may help to account further for some of the odd statistical results that Mr. Kennedy gets.

It is astonishing that supposedly intelligent writers of the Left should show so much concern over the conclusion, of mere technical interest even if true, that "small" corporations earned more in 1925 than in 1929. Owners of small corporations are, after all, capitalists. If only 1,000 or so "big" corporations were doing better in 1929 than in 1925, and everybody else in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

country was doing worse, how account for the fact that our national-income estimates show a total of $55,191,000,000 paid out in wages and salaries in 1929 compared with only $47,651,000,000 paid out as wages and salaries in 1925?

New York City HENRY HAZLITT

SIR: As to whether I "misstated" any of Mr. Hazlitt's points, or "implicitly granted the validity" of any of his criticisms, neither he nor I is competent to judge objectively. I, for one, am happy to leave such judgment to anyone who cares to read Mr. Hazlitt's review and my comments on it. It had seemed to me that all I did was to catch Mr. Hazlitt with his critical pants completely down. But again, I am glad to leave judgment on that to anyone other than Mr. Hazlitt.

The points to which Mr. Hazlitt devotes the bulk of his letter strike me as interesting, answerable and entirely irrelevant to the question immediately at issue—which was the soundness of Mr. Hazlitt's review as originally written. Perhaps I am wrong about their irrelevance, but for a third time I am delighted to leave that judgment to others. Also, I had not remembered that either Mr. Kennedy or I ever made so broad a statement as that "everybody else in the country was doing worse" in 1929 than in 1925. Does Mr. Hazlitt imply that one or both of us said that? It seems so to me, but once more the judgment is not mine to make.

Unlike Mr. Hazlitt, I am never astonished when those who hold views at variance with mine place the emphasis of their arguments on points which, from my approach, seem irrelevant or trivial. I am only astonished when they seem to me to betray their own awareness of the inherent frailty of their contentions by the belligerence with which they feel forced to defend them.

New Haven, Conn. FRED RODELL

Down the Ostrich Hole

SIR: I had to smile when I opened your letter and read "Let's make America a fine and happy place to live in." Of all magazines—and there have been many I have read during my span of life—I have never come across more depressing news than printed in The New Republic. It was presented to me as a gift—one Christmas (of all times). So I felt duty bound to read it carefully. After a number of years I gave up. I even dreaded the day of its arrival, because of the gloom it cast all through our happy home. I finally, supported by the family, asked the generous giver, as kindly as I could, to please not present it to us any longer. No one could read The New Republic and be lighthearted.

San Diego, Calif. A VERY OLD PIONEER

The Gallup Poll

SIR: In his article on "Dr. Gallup's Statistics" (November 1) Mr. Lindsay Rogers seems to overemphasize several very practical limitations of the Gallup poll. Consequently, there exists some confusion concerning what can and what cannot be measured in public-opinion surveys.

Mr. Rogers complains that no qualitative sorting is done on the flat "Yes-No" responses which Dr. Gallup publishes in his syndicated newspaper column. He implies that therefore the polls are unable to measure the intensity of public opinion.

Here it might be remembered that a more or less complicated breakdown of the quality of various opinions would run into two difficulties. First, there would be a much greater expense in enlarging the sample to ensure statistical accuracy. And second, there is the obvious difficulty of presenting these breakdowns to a newspaper audience, which, on the whole, is no more interested in the intricacies of public opinion than in the intricacies of the issues involved.

What Mr. Rogers seems to want in connection with public opinion on the Japan-China situation—to use his own example—is a correlated study of silk stockings, fishline, imported light bulbs and crabmeat purchases among those who think that Japan has behaved herself rather badly. But this kind of evidence would be too costly for institutional work such as Dr. Gallup's, not to speak of being somewhat afield from his major purpose.

The Gallup poll is not a substitute for the national vote. Just as Mr. Rogers says, "the process of a decision in a democracy involves a good deal more than discovering whether there is a plurality or a majority which favors a particular course of action." But what Dr. Gallup *is* trying to do, in my opinion, is to bring to a representative democracy that "head hunting" which, in the pressure of making decisions, the people have not known about and the politicians have been inclined to overlook.

Evanston, Ill. SHERWOOD DODGE

From The New Republic Mail Bag

The "Report on Montreal" we printed November 1 got quite a rise out of one Montrealer, R. B. S., who starts out in a level enough tone to doubt John Jones's statement that enlisted men have to go overseas willy-nilly, pointing out official statements to the contrary and to the recent report that 90 percent of one battalion had volunteered specifically to go across. But when R. B. S. warms up on the subject of how we are always against England in "the conversion of a great empire into a community of virtually free states," it gets too much for him and he closes: "So far as we are concerned you may keep yourselves safe; but how about keeping yourselves quiet?" . . . Robert Preyer sends us a letter from Riverside Drive to say he thinks we have a swell paper, all except most of it, which he trusts we will change directly along lines laid out. He says among other things that he cannot abide Ferguson's "reviews of motion pictures long before or after they come out"—to which Ferguson said, "Could be." Mr. Preyer added that all such jigsaw puzzles were "not worth the trouble of putting them together," at which point Ferguson left the office shouting "Who the hell asked him to? *I'm* the guy that puts those together."

Minna H. Breuer, of Cincinnati, thought David Daiches' article on Aldous Huxley (November 1) splendid and wishes we'd held it back until an estimate of "After Many a Summer" could have been included. Several other correspondents, some of whose letters we shall try to print soon, thought different. Also in the literary department is Oscar Levy, editor of the authorized English translation of Nietzsche's works, who writes from London to say that in deploring the rape of Prague, Poland, etc., we have omitted to deplore the rape of Nietzsche by the Nazis. "He, the herald of Life, has likewise been commandeered as part of the German *Lebensraum*."

Checks-for-Your-Letter-Box.—The North Georgia Review announces a contest ("Do You Know Your South?") which will carry through three issues starting with the Autumn number, and which will award $250 (or $300 in books) to the reader of The Review who answers "most correctly and adequately 100 questions about the South" put by the editors. Details from the editors at Clayton, Georgia. And Poetry Magazine announces the award of a $600 total of prizes for work appearing in its pages over the year just ended. E. E. Cummings, Stephen Spender, Maxwell Bodenheim, John Malcolm Brinnin, H. B. Mallalieu and Malcolm Cowley were the winners. Poetry thought that as our man Cowley was included in the list, we should be interested. So was our man Cowley, who hadn't heard a word of it till then and is still too bemused to set up any noticeable drinks. The Town Hall, 123 West Forty-third Street, New York City, is going to give away $1,000 for the best essays on the subject "What Does Democracy Mean to Me?" Details on request.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books in Review

Mr. Justice Frankfurter

A GOOD JUDGE must be sensitive to the forces that are making the future, for it is the future that will assess his judgments. It was this prescience of forces yet inchoate but destined to dominion that earned for John Marshall the simple characterization, "the great Chief Justice." Something of this prophetic sensitiveness illuminates the fugitive pieces of Mr. Justice Frankfurter which have been collected by two of his law students in "Law and Politics."[1] The central theme to which these writings are directed is most clearly formulated in the two essays, "Why I Shall Vote for La Follette" and "Social Issues Before the Supreme Court." In the former piece, which appeared in The New Republic in October, 1924, Mr. Frankfurter wrote: "'Great inequality of property' is the most significant characteristic of our social-economic life." In the latter essay, which appeared in the spring of 1933, the author characterizes as "the most inclusive of all our problems" the question "how to subdue our anarchic competitive economy to reason, how to correct the disharmonies between production and consumption?"

The author's goal, expressed in one of the rare moments when he permits himself an ultimate goal, is "an enduring division of the goods of civilization to an extent never before attempted." The politics of tolerance, reliance upon "facts" discovered by "experts," distrust of "doctrinaire principles" and unshakable loyalty to the method of democracy are the instruments with which this goal and these problems are faced. The answers, given over a period of twenty-five years, are neither original nor conclusive, and history has already caught up with most of them. But perhaps it is more accurate to say, as Mr. Frankfurter, in reviewing "The American Leviathan," says of the once heretical Beard, that he "has helped to make the times, thus achieving the ultimate success of every thinker in politics, namely, to rob his ideas of novelty."

Directly, or through the generations of his students—the heroes of his essay, "The Young Men Go to Washington"—Professor Frankfurter helped to bring into being many of the laws which Mr. Justice Frankfurter will interpret. The principle of collective bargaining which he defended in 1920, the case against industrial government by injunction which he outlined in The New Republic in 1922 and pressed to completion in later works, the public demands which he formulated in 1933 for a tighter control of corporate directorates and banks and for a wider judicial tolerance of federal taxation, are already part of the living law.

One may wonder what there is left for Mr. Justice Frankfurter to contribute to a court and to a body of law that have already accepted his chief teachings. Yet such wonder would stem from a false estimate of the judicial function. Leadership in social progress has never come, and is not likely to come, from the bench. A leader of men must move, or at least stand, and on the bench one can do neither. Something other than social leadership is demanded of a good judge, and that is the ability to find, at least occasionally, judgments which in retrospect will satisfy both sides. Only in this way are the divisive forces that develop within any society held in check, and only thus is the need for an ultimate resort to force in the maintenance of society minimized. That Felix Frankfurter possesses these qualities of judgeship in an extraordinary degree was made clear when men of different classes, rival organizations, divergent interests and conflicting ideals united temporarily to acclaim his appointment to the bench.

These essays show something of the mastery of multiple perspectives that is the most basic qualification of a great judge. Negatively this shows itself in a scrupulous avoidance of epithets and emotion-arousing verbalisms, and in a discreet silence on issues which are so formulated that any answer must leave at least one party bitter (*e. g.*, the President's court plan, the abolition of the judicial veto, the issue of "individualism" versus "collectivism"). Positively, this quality appears in a sensitive appreciation of the high hopes and honest sacrifices that lie behind ideas with which the author disagrees, and in a persistent search for the implicit agreements that underlie the bitterest controversies.

"With us the task of political leadership," writes Mr. Frankfurter, in his essay "Why I Am for Governor Roosevelt,"

> is to adjust the conflicting interests of diverse groups in the community and to bend the hostility and suspicion and ignorance engendered by group interest to the reconciliation of a common interest and a common understanding. Mr. Hoover has tragically failed as a political and popular leader because he distrusts the democratic process of reasoning with equals.

The task of the law is no different from the task of politics, thus formulated, though the tools with which courts approach that task are more limited than those available to politicians.

The Supreme Court of tomorrow is likely to be a different institution from that which existed from the Dred Scott decision until the President's court plan. A court with perhaps two or three justices to the left of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and another one or two not far to his right, is not likely to substitute its own judgment of social issues for the judgment of the people and their elected representatives. Thus, the Supreme Court would abdicate the chief role it has filled for three-quarters of a century in our social and economic life. What would be left for a court of unusual energies and abilities would be primarily, I suspect, the task that falls to the highest courts in other lands, the task of bringing a nation's judicial and administrative practices into conformity with its legal ideals. In his dealings with trial courts Mr. Justice Frankfurter, along with his eight brethren, will lack the experience of the judicial process that comes to a trial judge, but at least he will have the wisdom

[1] Law and Politics: Occasional Papers of Felix Frankfurter, 1913-1938, edited by Archibald MacLeish and E. F. Prichard Jr. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 376 pages. $3

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and strength to protect that process from the sub-surface prejudices which are analyzed in the essay on the Sacco-Vanzetti case. In passing upon the legality of administrative acts, Mr. Justice Frankfurter is likely to give effect to a sympathy for the expert administrator's viewpoint that is grounded in his own experience and manifest in these essays. Yet this volume does not offer a blank judicial check to petty bureaucrats in high places who confuse ruthlessness with efficiency, despise old-fashioned safeguards of fair hearing, and consider generally that the greatness of their ends justifies the meanness of their means. A healthy democratic insistence that public servants are servants and that public agencies shall not engage in "lawlessness and hysteria" underlies Mr. Frankfurter's incisive criticisms of various actions of Secretary of State Kellogg, Postmaster General Burleson and Attorney General Palmer that were not authorized by any act of Congress.

Mr. MacLeish and Mr. Prichard have given us an excellent cross-section of Mr. Frankfurter's legal mind, from the extreme left of his campaign article supporting La-Follette to the extreme right of his attempt to defend the Supreme Court's veto of the Child Labor Tax Law. Lawyer readers will be shocked by the almost total lack of footnotes in a volume edited by two former Harvard Law students—dozens of quotations float through the pages unanchored in time or space—but I suppose those laymen who like to read in one dimension will be pleased by this lapse from the scholarly tradition.

And laymen should read this book. A public that insists upon open discussion of the social views and associations of candidates for legislative and executive office has too often in the past allowed the appointment to high judicial posts of candidates whose views were hidden from public scrutiny. This has made it possible to stack the Supreme Court, from time to time, with justices who were thoroughly out of sympathy with the developing objectives and ideals of the society they were paid to serve. If future candidates for judicial office were compelled to follow Mr. Justice Frankfurter's wholesome example in opening to public view the padlocked premises of judicial reasoning, we might be able to extend to the judiciary the measure of democratic control that we have achieved in other branches of government.

FELIX S. COHEN

Number, Please

A. T. & T.: The Story of Industrial Conquest, by N. R. Danielian. New York: Vanguard Press. 480 pages. $3.75.
American Tel & Tel: The Story of a Great Monopoly, by Horace Coon. New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 296 pages. $3.

THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S recent investigation of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company has uncovered a great mass of hitherto unavailable information about the Telephone Company's affairs. N. R. Danielian's "A. T. & T." is, however, infinitely more than a journalistic survey of the Commission's findings. The author, a former instructor in economics at Harvard, is now a financial and utility expert at the FCC. Familiar with the problems presented not only by the Telephone Company but also by the large corporation as a type, he is neither awed nor scandalized by Telephone's status as world's largest.

"A. T. & T." is a long book (more than 200,000 words); it is so detailed that it sometimes catalogues rather than selects; and it closes on a political rather than an economic note. (Dr. Danielian argues that the Telephone Company—"a state within a state"—is as much a political as an economic entity, but it is difficult to develop this thesis in terms of any one corporation, however large.) From his pages, however, there emerges a comprehensive and convincing study of corporate character—a study which, without sensationalism or muckraking, builds up into an indictment that cannot possibly be dismissed.

The Telephone Company, with its 664,000 stockholders and its average holding of 28.1 shares per stockholder, has often been cited as the supreme example of a corporation "publicly held" through the public's ownership of its stock. Dr. Danielian ruins this myth by showing that 36.8 percent of the stockholders own only 3.8 percent of the shares and own them in lots of less than five shares each. He also shows that 57.5 percent of the stockholders have only 9.9 percent of the shares in lots of less than ten shares each. Not only have these stockholders no voice in the management, but they cannot possibly be considered as dependent upon a dividend income which ranges from $9 to $90 a year.

At the other end of the scale, 1,034 large stockholders own more than 3,000,000 shares—16.6 percent of the total—and the 43 largest stockholders own nearly 1,000,000 shares—5.2 percent of the total. When, in 1935, the Telephone Company declared dividends of $168,000,000, its 1,034 largest stockholders got $28,000,000 of this sum.

Another vital point in Dr. Danielian's analysis concerns the increase in the Telephone Company's depression dividends and the decrease in its depression payroll. Between 1929 and 1935, no less than 185,000 Bell System (including Western Electric) workers lost their jobs—a reduction of nearly 40 percent from the 1929 level. But the Telephone Company's dividends in 1935 were $52,000,000 greater than they had been in 1929. For during this period the outstanding stock had been increased from 13,220,000 to 18,662,000 shares, and thus there were 5,400,000 additional shares on which to pay the $9 dividend which the company never passed or even reduced. As Dr. Danielian says: "A reduction of one dollar in the annual dividends . . . would have saved about $18,662,000 a year. This amount could retain at work 18,000 telephone employees of the grade that were laid off."

Yet such a dividend reduction would have made only an "inappreciable change" in the income of 95 percent of Telephone stockholders (who own less than 100 shares) and would have worked no hardship on the other 5 percent who belong to the class that collects most of the dividends that all the corporations pay.

"A. T. & T." is not primarily a statistical study. Its narrative chapters include the early history of the Bell System, a remarkably clear description of the transfer from Boston to New York control, and a graphic account of Telephone's attempt to control the telegraph industry, the radio industry and the motion-picture industry. The profits of the Telephone Company, its peculiar relationship to Western Electric and the significance of its depreciation policy are carefully analyzed. The question of telephone rates has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been deliberately (and statedly) subordinated to the "social evaluation" of the company.

I do not altogether agree with Dr. Danielian's concept of the Telephone Company as a "state within a state"—an idea expressed also in the statement that "the Bell System . . . is a political organization of the first magnitude." Admitting that the Telephone management is independent of the stockholders as a whole, I think that a small group of large stockholders keep the management under constant pressure to maintain earnings, dividends and the market price of the stock. But this difference of opinion does not alter the fact that "A. T. & T." is a penetrating analysis that no one interested in American economics can afford to miss.

Mr. Coon's story is superficial and is marred by a weakness for sitting on both sides of the fence. He says, in the same sentence, that "although enormous and probably unjustified profits have been made, the record of 'A. T. & T.' has been remarkably clean." Concerning the company's "considerable influence" on legislatures and public officials, he observes that there has been no "crass purchase," no "vulgar buying." This might pass for sarcasm, but Mr. Coon adds:

> Certainly, considering the morality of our politicians and their anxiety to be bought, it is extraordinary that political friendliness has been achieved without the usual necessity of downright purchase. . . .

Mr. Coon's book is readable, moves rapidly, has much of what is commonly known as "color." But he is not only on the outside, looking in. Usually he is also on the ground floor, looking up.

E. D. KENNEDY

With Clive in India

Clive of Plassey, by A. Mervyn Davies. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 532 pages. $3.75.

MR. MERVYN DAVIES has written the kind of biography best suited to Clive of India by concentrating on period and background and allowing the man to stand out simply as their representative. He wastes no space on trifling tidbits of family life, or on military exploits except where they are as important to the whole picture as they were to Clive himself—for example, the battles of Arcot and Plassey, which brought the first Indian province under English influence, besides giving their victor renown and a peerage.

So it is the times in which Clive lived that must be considered here, and it is hard to think of a book that presents them with greater clarity. First, the European background—the eternal conflict between English and French that ultimately involved their trading stations in India. Second, eastern India in the last days of the Mogul Empire, when it was falling apart into rival states and when the Indian princes tried to bolster their claims by taking sides in the Europeans' quarrel. Third, the inevitable consequence of their action, the passing of power from the hands of the Indian ruler into those of the European he had favored.

Such is the bare, mechanical motion of the first British conquests in India. Underneath lie the economic, political and human forces, inextricably involved and interactive. In the saddle is the East India Company, interested solely in profits and helped by conditions in England to enlist adventurous youths into its service. These men—and Clive was one of them—saw India simply as a gold mine from which they might cheat a fortune large enough to buy affluent living at home and even a seat in Parliament. The study of the relations betwen the Company and its servants is perhaps the most interesting of the many absorbing aspects of "Clive of Plassey," with the basic theme always that of an underpaid civil servant carving out a personal fortune while the Company stands horrified at the idea of aggressive methods which might endanger its own established interests.

NIGEL DENNIS

Our Enemy the Sea

Cape Horn, by Felix Riesenberg. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. 467 pages. $5.
Men Under the Sea, by Edward Ellsberg. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. 377 pages. $3.
The Cruise of the Raider "Wolf," by Roy Alexander. New Haven: Yale University Press. 293 pages. $2.75.

"CAPE HORN" is simply too big a book—eighty square inches in area and nearly two inches thick. Also its arrangement is cumbersome: history, navigation, anthropology, seamanship, gunnery, surveying—each is considered only as it touches on the Cape Horn region, which is a historic but arbitrary point, with no historical continuity of its own. Over hundreds of years the great sea empires, Spain, Portugal, the English and the Dutch, were sending their captains out to do the impossible; and after Magellan those who sailed to the west, whether for trade, booty, exploration or acts of war, ran into the treacherous welter of the passage under the Americas. There were Del Cano, Loaysa, Drake, Sarmiento and John Davis, Schouten and the Nodal brothers—literally scores of voyages, on down through the "Bounty" and the "Beagle" (Riesenberg does a neat job on Darwin as the young English snob and sensation-monger of the Cape population); and Riesenberg's own first doubling in sail.

But though thousands of men in their time hung there for weeks and months, with fewer surviving than not, living out fantasies more grim and wild than any horror-writer would try on, the Cape was the crisis-point rather than the story of each such action. This limitation, plus the inevitable sameness of a hundred incidents (some of them mere briefs for the record), plus the author's own technical interests, makes the book slow reading. As an armchair navigator, I was glad to have its thorough history of a region around which I have spent some considerable time in books. On the other hand, there is no good reason against saying that its extensive information is fairly useless. But certainly some monument is due the memory of those thousands of unimaginably valiant and enduring and often brilliant men, who took their ridiculous box of wood and canvas out to the edge of the world, and jumped off.

The sea is a magnificent adversary in many ways, and long after Magellan fought to remain above the surface, other men are faced with the problem of how to reach it. Edward Ellsberg's "Men Under the Sea" is about sub-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

marines and diving. This time he starts with the "S-4" and his work as her salvage officer; goes on to the problems and history of diving and escape mechanisms; and ends with the story of the "Squalus." The first part he has written before; the last was added in some apparent haste and does not include the salvage or subsequent findings. But the subject is fascinating and has never been so well covered, for we have read of the thing divers call the bends, but never had their cause and effect so thoroughly explained and illustrated; we could hardly imagine the horror of losing pressure ("the squeeze") or getting too much ("blowing up"), or the numbing and weakening effects of diving under the best conditions.

As a naval engineer, actual diver (he perfected what is now called the Ellsberg underwater torch and had a frighteningly close shave on the "S-4"), student and competent writer, Commander Ellsberg is the one man to speak on his craft—and one of the few men who have been able to bring the complex excitement of any craft to us.

This is a hop-and-skip book, not always well written and occasionally sententious. Besides, Ellsberg though human has the old navy touch. He finds it little more than curious coincidence that the Mommsen-lung idea was pigeonholed for years by the Admiralty old ladies, who rarely go down in anything but elevators, shudder about "expenses" and then build a billion dollars' worth of submarines. He says that no underwater disaster resulted from anything but some human negligence, without seeming to ask himself how so much unsleeping vigilance can be humanly expected. He sees nothing incongruous in then talking about a shortage of divers and salvage equipment, and watertight doors that bulged and gave under the pressure of water (what the hell were they made for, keeping flies out?). But though "Men Under the Sea" isn't Ellsberg's best book, it seems that when a better account of work below the surface is written, he will have to write it.

Roy Alexander is the most naïve of these three, but his subject is easily the most dramatic and complete in itself. "The Cruise of the Raider 'Wolf' " tells the story of a disguised cruiser the Germans fitted out and got past all blockades during the war. With every port closed to it, with coal bunkers and hundreds of prisoners to be fed (too humane to shoot them, the captain couldn't risk putting them ashore to blab), this ghost ship steamed 64,000 miles between Kiel and New Zealand in fifteen months, captured or mined 135,000 tons of shipping (they even laid mine fields off Singapore), and limped back to port with scurvy in the hold and a foot of growth on the bottom. In addition to 400 mines, she carried seven 5.9-inch guns, four torpedo tubes, small arms, a seaplane and a picked crew of 400.

The hero of the book is Captain Nerger, a wiser and more deadly sea devil than Count von Luckner ever was (he seems to have lost the "Seeadler" through foolishness); but without a press agent. With the courage to sit quietly on a powder mine for a year or light a match to it if necessary, he had caution, wile and foresight enough to equip a navy. He was a stern master, but just, and he kept that ship up to an unbelievable level of efficiency through hell, high water and worse. Without the kind of faith and loyalty he seems to have commanded, the impossible would simply have remained the impossible.

Roy Alexander, an Australian radio man, was taken prisoner when the "Wolf" was a few months out. He seems an accurate observer and a good sober fellow, and though the prisoner's quarters were another Black Hole of Calcutta, with food dwindling and disease gaining, he gives his account without rancor and with a seaman's admiration for the German officers and crew. He is hereby forgiven all the fits, starts, repetitions and bungles of the non-writer.

OTIS FERGUSON

Science and Marxism

The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences, by J. B. S. Haldane. New York: Random House. 224 pages. $2.
The Social Function of Science, by J. D. Bernal. New York: The Macmillan Company. 498 pages. $3.50.

IT IS NO EXAGGERATION to say that, with the appearance of these two remarkable volumes, Marxism definitely becomes a major influence in our thinking on the role of science in society. Haldane's approach to it is that of a practising scientist who has found in dialectical materialism —especially as developed by Friedrich Engels—an extraordinarily powerful instrument for the interpretation of nature and the control of natural phenomena for human ends. After an introductory chapter in which—with apologies for his ignorance of philosophy—he expounds fundamental principles, we come to the real meat of his book: the conscious application of these principles to the data and methods of five basic sciences and the two social sciences of psychology and sociology. It is surprising to observe how, by deliberately substituting for metaphysical concepts the constant give-and-take of opposing forces within a field of study, such abstractions as Time and Space, matter, energy, mass, the cell and the organism, body and soul, lose their power to confuse and become the operating elements in an unending dialectical process. It is a process, moreover, in which the human intelligence directly participates: first, by the mere act of observation—as when studying the "indeterminate" behavior of atoms—and second, by deliberate will—as when planning against flood, drought and pestilence, or organizing to prevent fascism and war.

In one of his best chapters—that on biology—Haldane describes the supposed antagonism between mutation and selection, showing that from these "opposites"—each of which tends to negate the other—there may develop organisms of enormous potential value in the evolutionary process. From the classical Darwinian point of view this fact is just a nuisance, but for Marxists it will assume major significance in their struggle not merely to interpret the world but to change it.

That struggle, of whose necessity Haldane is keenly aware in his final chapter on sociology, is the keynote of Dr. Bernal's encyclopedic survey of world science. It is difficult to give a concise idea of the range of this closely printed volume, but of one thing we may be certain: it will be an indispensable authority for years to come in all serious discussions of the technical, social, financial and administrative problems of science.

For Dr. Bernal all these problems center in the fact that science is fundamentally a collective activity whose healthy development is inseparable from the intelligent and effective planning of all social functions. This idea is by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no means new—Lancelot Hogben's sprawling colossus, "Science for the Citizen," is full of it—but Bernal's treatment of it is unique in its emphasis upon the necessity for organization in every field of scientific research. Having, in the first part of his book, described the appalling chaos of science in most European countries—degenerating to refined barbarism under the Fascist regimes of Italy and Germany—he proceeds, in the second part, to offer us his blueprints of "What Science Could Do" in a really free society where planning based on Marxist principles had become possible.

This may sound like just another Utopia, but no one who studies Dr. Bernal's richly documented work, with its array of evidence from hundreds of sources, its careful attention to detail and its dramatic pictures of what science is actually prepared to do here and now, can honestly doubt that if improvement is possible, it must come along the lines which he has indicated. The terrible question of when, where and how to start is beyond the power of any individual, or even any one group, to answer. Dr. Bernal, in sharp disagreement with H. G. Wells and Professor Hogben, has no faith in the capacity of scientists alone to "change the world." Like Haldane, he is firmly convinced that change is inevitable. And if, like Haldane and so many others, he finds the secret of this change in the ideals and accomplishments of the Soviet Union, those who dissent may fairly be challenged to provide a better and more workable alternative.

HAROLD WARD

A Reader's List

THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK (Farrar and Rinehart, $1.50). The British feel so sure of their case that they present it with scrupulous fairness. The most interesting of the documents presented here are Sir Nevile Henderson's reports of his interviews with Ribbentrop and Hitler—neither of whom, he feels, was quite a gentleman.

UNDER THE BRITISH UMBRELLA, by Helen P. Kirkpatrick (Scribner's, $2.75). An American foreign correspondent's objective and sometimes vivid account of Great Britain going to war, from the breakdown of the League to the declaration on September 3. Shrewd remarks on the British backbone and upper lip.

MAUD, edited by Richard Lee Strout (Macmillan, $3.50). In her vivacious, objective account of her life from 1881 to 1895, this pert blue-stocking belle of Cairo, Illinois, develops a complete picture of her own personality and of an equally colorful era.

SHAKESPEARE IN AMERICA, by Esther C. Dunn (Macmillan, $3.50). A cross-section of the intellectual history of America, rather than just another angle of Shakespeare criticism. Although Miss Dunn writes for the average reader, lighting up her history with plenty of anecdotes, she painlessly injects much erudite information.

WHERE THE RIVERS MEET, by Ward Dorrance (Scribner's, $2.75). A canoe trip on the Mississippi and its great tributaries. Mr. Dorrance combines Thoreau's intense feeling for the personalities of beasts and birds and Carl Carmer's appreciation of racy, backwoods life with a gift for vivid phrase—"Night that is velvet as a horse's nose," "Whirlpools that smack like alligators turning in a tank." A travel book that makes you think of Stevenson's "Inland Voyage."

GRANDFATHER WAS QUEER, by Richardson Wright (Lippincott, $3). The title is somewhat misleading, as the eccentric grandfather appears only as the introduction to this account of peddlers, hermits, cracker-barrel philosophers, rogues, itinerant preachers and other oddities in the colonial and pioneer period of our nation. More conscientious than lively, except in spots.

WHAT'S YOUR ALLERGY? by Dr. Laurence Farmer and George Hexter (Random House, $2). About 10 or 15 percent of all the people in this country are subject to some form of allergy, including hay-fever, asthma, eczema, etc. For these people and their friends, a writer and an expert have collaborated on a simple discussion of the causes of allergies and what to do about them. Warning: they are not aware of any panaceas.

Fiction

O. HENRY MEMORIAL AWARD PRIZE STORIES OF 1939, edited by Harry Hansen (Doubleday, Doran, $2.50). "Barn Burning" (Faulkner), "Bat Flight" (James Still) and "Calves" (De Jong) are this year's prizes, well enough deserved except for the last, which seems put together with scissors and pathos. Caroline Gordon, Kay Boyle, Irwin Shaw, Millen Brand and eight others also run.

ONE HOUSE CONTAINS US, by Oscar Leonard (Liveright, $2.) The story of an intelligent failure who hitched his wagon to a political star—expecting nothing and getting what he expected—wrapped around the point that personality, not intelligence or character, counts in politics. The field of action is Rumania (Mr. Leonard's book is an adaptation of an original by Dmitri Theodorescu), but sounds like any other country. Witty and detached.


KEEP AMERICA OUT OF WAR
A PROGRAM
By NORMAN THOMAS and BERTRAM D. WOLFE
The most controversial book that has yet appeared on the most vital subject in our history.
• It shows what will happen if we go in.
• It shows what will happen if we go half-way in.
• It shows the forces that are dragging us in.
• It gives a definite program, divorced from politics, to keep us out.
$1.50 at all bookstores.
FREDERICK A. STOKES CO.
443 Fourth Ave., New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MOUNTAIN TOP, by Claire Sainte-Soline (Dodd, Mead, $2.50). A youngish Grenoble business man tries escape from personal problems by turning farmer and shepherd in the Chartreuse mountains. Jean Giono would have treated the same subject with more gusto. But the observation of scenery and animal life is fresh and convincing, in spite of a rather stilted literalness in translation.

IF NOT VICTORY, by Frank O. Hough (Carrick and Evans, $2.50). How the spirit of '76 didn't affect plain country folk in Westchester County. The hero isn't even quite sure which side to join when the shooting starts; it takes a British prison to make him appreciate the Rebels. Pleasant and intelligent story-telling.

PARDON ME FOR POINTING, by Arthur Kober (Simon and Schuster, $2). Sketches about New York, Broadway, Hollywood, etc. Away from the Bronx and the summer camps, Mr. Kober is agreeable but nothing special. Might have been called, "Pardon Me for No Point."

News About Books and Magazines

To encourage younger novelists who are trying to record the impact of social forces on their generation, Modern Age Books announces a thousand-dollar award, donated by the Kaufman Department Stores of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the best novel dealing with American youth. Manuscripts must be submitted before May 1, 1940. For entry blanks and further information, write Modern Age Books, 432 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

Among the recent releases of the Division of Social Research, Works Progress Administration, are three books of special interest to students of rural problems: "Changing Aspects of Rural Relief," "Rural Families on Relief" and "Migrant Families"; and a report on the result of research into city relief problems —"Changing Aspects of Urban Relief." All four books are distributed by the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

Contributors

MAX LERNER is professor of Political Science at Williams College, and author of "It Is Later Than You Think" and "Ideas Are Weapons," the latter published on November 17 by Viking Press.

H. N. BRAILSFORD, London correspondent for The New Republic, is widely known as a writer on history, economics and international affairs. His many books include "Rebel India," which was published in The New Republic Dollar Series.

KATHERINE RODELL—formerly Katherine Carr, before her marriage to Fred Rodell—is the author of "South American Primer." She was in charge of research for Fortune Magazine's South American series.

DR. WILLIAM G. ROYLANCE served for many years in the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor.

JOHN STEVENS is the pseudonym of a young American who has been living in Russia for several years.

E. D. KENNEDY, for ten years an associate editor of Time and Fortune, is the author of "Dividends to Pay," recently published by Reynal and Hitchcock.

FELIX S. COHEN is the author of "Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals" and contributes to various philosophical and legal journals. He is an assistant solicitor and member of the Board of Appeals in the Department of the Interior.

NIGEL DENNIS is a young English novelist and critic who lives in New York City.

HAROLD WARD's special interest is in the social implications of science and technology, a subject on which he contributes frequently to various periodicals.

"The celebrated malice of the distinguished Miss Clare Boothe is just the thing we have needed to supply us with a good anti-Nazi melodrama."—*Richard Watts, Herald Tribune.*
CLARE BOOTHE'S HIT! **MARGIN FOR ERROR**
Bert Lytell Sam Levene Bramwell Fletcher | Directed by
Elspeth Eric Leif Erickson Philip Coolidge | OTTO L. PREMINGER
PLYMOUTH THEATRE WEST 45th STREET. Evenings 8:45. Matinees: Wednesday and Saturday 2:45

BOOKS
POSTAGE FREE
Books of all publishers promptly mailed anywhere in the U.S.A.
NEW REPUBLIC BOOKS
40 E. 49th St., New York, N. Y.

THE VENDOME
Madison Ave. at 3rd St., Lakewood, N. J.
TELEPHONE: Lakewood 555
Special diets and nursing care under the personal supervision of a registered nurse.
PRIVATE BATHS MODERATE RATES
PRIVATE SUN PORCHES
Open all year.

THANKSGIVING
An old fashioned Thanksgiving in an 18th century farm house. Turkey, charades, country auctions, cranberry sauce, square dances, cider, open fires, furnace, all modern conveniences. Wed. to Sun., $10. Reservation only.
ERTOBA FARM, R. 2, Quakertown, Pa.

LECTURE
CORLISS LAMONT, speaks on: "A WAY OF LIFE FOR MODERN MAN" on Tues. Eve. Nov. 21st at 8:30 P. M. at Hotel Peter Stuyvesant—2 West 86th St. Admission 50c. Social Hour—Refreshments—THE GROUP FORUM.

HANDWRITING ANALYSIS
HANDWRITING scientifically analyzed by psychologist (Ph.D.). Detailed $2. 15 pen written lines. State age and sex. Dr. Reiss (Universities of Heidelberg and Paris). 4410 Broadway, New York City. LO 7-7747.

POSITION WANTED
WRITER, 45, art—Russian expert, wants a steady job: art collection, library, research. Address: Box 193, The New Republic.

APARTMENT WANTED
SUBLET, 2-3 room furnished apartment. December, January, February. Reasonable. University couple, prefer near Columbia. Address: Box 194, New Republic.

APARTMENT TO SHARE
GENTLEMAN, mature, alert, wishes to share pleasant, 3-room apartment. Jackson Heights, near subway. Reasonable. Phone 4 to 6 P. M. HA 6-3531.

SOCIAL CLUB
NEW Contacts—thru our Personal Service dedicated to the promotion of friendships. Discriminating clientele. Write or phone.
AMERICAN SERVICE
3140 N. Godwin Terrace New York City
Telephone: KIngsbridge 6-2921

CORRESPONDENCE CLUBS
GET ACQUAINTED CLUB — National organization, with live wire members, coast to coast. All ages, either sex. If lonely, write Simpson, Box 1251, Denver, Colo.
FORMER EPISCOPALIAN Minister conducts a Correspondence Club for "bona fide" men and women. Inquiries welcomed. Address John Hodson, Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin.

LITERARY HELP
THESIS WORK, RESEARCH PAPERS. Special Articles, Addresses, promptly prepared to requirements of busy professionals. Our extensive experience available at moderate rates, with assurance of scholarly serviceable results. AUTHORS RESEARCH BUREAU, 516 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Classroom subscription rate to
THE NEW REPUBLIC
25c a month per student
for orders of 10 or more copies to one address. Desk copies free.
THE NEW REPUBLIC
40 East 49th St. New York City

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED